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SINCE THE ONSET of the international  debt crisis in the early 1980s, the 
dismal  economic performance  of the Latin American  debtor  countries 
has been  frequently  contrasted  with  the strong  performance  of their  East 
Asian counterparts. Table 1 documents the remarkable  difference. 
Throughout  East Asia, with the exception of the Philippines,  the devel- 
oping countries  have maintained  strong  growth  rates and low inflation. 
None but the Philippines  has been forced  to reschedule  its foreign  debt. 
On  the other  hand,  throughout  Latin  America,  with  the partial  exception 
of Colombia, national incomes have grown slowly or have declined, 
inflation  has surged, and debtors have been forced to reschedule  their 
outstanding  debts. 
Many analysts have already  tackled the problem  of explaining  why 
Latin  America's  record  is so poor compared  with East Asia's. Each has 
pointed  to different  "lessons" to be learned.  I  Some argue  that  the Asian 
record  is better  because the external  shocks that  hit the Asian countries 
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1. A thorough  and stimulating  comparison  of the two regions  can be found  in Ching- 
yuan Lin, "Latin America  and East Asia: A Comparative  Development  Perspective" 
(International  Monetary  Fund, unpublished  manuscript,  1985).  Bela Balassa  has written 
extensively  on the patterns  of adjustment  in the developing  countries  after 1973,  with  an 
emphasis  on the trade regime. That work has greatly influenced  this paper. See, for 
example, "Adjustment  Policies in Developing Countries: A  Reassessment," World 
Development,  vol. 12  (September  1984),  pp. 955-72, and  various  references  cited  therein. 
Other  studies  comparing  Asia  and  Latin  America  will  be mentioned  throughout  this  report. 
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Table 1.  Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia,  1970-84 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Per capita 
GDP growth  Inflation  GDP 
_________  ____  ____  _________  in 1983  Year- of 
Country  1970-81  1981-84  1970-81  1981-84  (dollars)  reschleduling 
Latin America 
Argentina  1.6  -0.1  130.8  340.4  2,000a  1984 
Brazil  7.6  0.8  40.5  142.2  1,618  1983, 1984 
Chile  2.8  -  3.2  42.7  18.8  1,692  1983 
Mexico  6.7  -0.9  17.5  74.4  1,901  1983, 1984 
Peru  3.4  -2.3  33.8  94.0  870  1983, 1984 
Venezuela  3.7  -2.2  9.1  9.3  4,124  1984 
Weighted average  5.6  -0.4  46.3  137.9  1,992 
Colombia  5.2  1.7  21.7  20.1  1,399  ... 
East Asia 
Indonesia  8.0  4.3  17.0  10.6  501  ... 
Korea  8.1  7.6  16.7  4.3  1,923  ... 
Malaysia  7.8  6.2  6.2  4.5  1,971  ... 
Thailand  7.1  5.3  10.0  3.3  812 
Weighted  average  7.8  5.8  14.4  6.5  1,197  ... 
Philippines  5.9  -0.6  13.5  22.2  665  1984 
Sources:  Gross domestic  product (GDP) is from Data Resources,  Inc.  (DRI),  International Data Base,  based  on 
country  sources.  Inflation is the annual average rate between  the dates  shown,  based on the consumer  price index 
from International Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics.  Per capita GDP is  calculated  by converting 
local  currency  GDP for  1983 by  the average  official exchange  rate for the  year.  The  rescheduling  dates  are from 
World Bank,  World Development  Report  1985 (World Bank,  1985), p.  28.  In this and subsequent  tables,  regional 
averages  are based on GDP shares for 1975-80. 
a.  Preliminary. 
in the early 1980s were less  severe than those that buffeted Latin 
America.2  Others suggest that the Latin American countries simply 
overborrowed.3  Some analysts, particularly  Bela Balassa and Anne 
Krueger,  point to exchange rate management  and the trade regime as 
being crucial. Supply-siders  contend that the Asian economies have 
flourished  under  lower tax rates, and many  other economists  join them 
in arguing  that the Asian economies have been market-oriented,  while 
the Latin  American  economies have not. 
The available empirical  evidence can help to discriminate  among 
2. For an example of this point of view, see Robert Solomon, "Brazil vs. Korea: 
Differing  Experiences  as Debtors," International  Economic  Letter (Washington,  D.C.: 
RS Associates, Inc., November  12, 1984). 
3. This appears  to be the view of Lance Taylor in "The Theory and Practice of 
Developing  Country  Debt:  An  Informal  Guide  for  the  Perplexed"  (Massachusetts  Institute 
of Technology,  1985). Jeffrey D. Sachs  525 
these alternative  views. Several do not hold up. As I argue below, 
"success" or "failure"  in economic performance  in the 1980s  does not 
seem to be importantly  tied to the size of external  shocks. Many  nations 
suffering  economic failure, such as Mexico and Venezuela, had rising 
terms  of trade  in the period  1975-83,  while many  of the successful Asian 
economies suffered  severe declines in their  terms  of trade.  Nor was the 
extent of foreign  borrowing  consistently  higher  in Latin  America  than  in 
Asia. Relative to gross domestic product (GDP), Korea and Thailand 
ran  current  account  deficits  in the 1970s  that  were as large  or larger  than 
the deficits in Latin America. By 1981, on the eve of the debt crisis, 
Korea's debt-GDP  ratio was higher than Brazil's. Too, the extent of 
government  involvement  in the economy appears  to be as great  in Asia 
as in Latin America. Trade policies in most Asian countries, while 
export-promoting,  were certainly not laissez-faire. State enterprises 
have played  a large  role in many  Asian  economies, as they have in Latin 
America.  Taxes as a percentage  of GDP are not significantly  different, 
on average,  in Asia and  Latin  America,  and  many  of the successful  Asian 
economies have tax revenues that are higher, as a proportion  of total 
income, than  those of many  of the "failures"  in Latin  America. 
The more important  differences seem to center on exchange rate 
management  and on the trade regime. Latin American and Asian 
borrowers  have differed  not only in the amounts  borrowed,  but also in 
the  uses to which  the  loans  were applied.  Simply  put, the Latin  American 
countries  did not use the foreign  borrowing  to develop a resource  base 
in tradable  goods, especially  export  industries,  adequate  for future  debt 
servicing. While current account-GDP ratios developed commensu- 
rately in the two regions, debt-export  ratios and debt service to export 
ratios diverged  markedly.  This divergence  occurred  for two main rea- 
sons. First, exports grew more rapidly  in Asia than in Latin America, 
and  indeed  export  growth  in Asia dramatically  outstripped  GDP  growth. 
In 1965,  the share  of exports  in GDP  was comparable  in the two regions. 
By 1980, the export-GDP  ratios in Asia were far higher  than those in 
Latin America. Second, overvalued exchange rates in Latin Amnerica 
encouraged  capital  flight.  Foreign  borrowing  by Latin  American  govern- 
ments (particularly  Argentina,  Mexico, and Venezuela) often went to 
finance  the private  sector's accumulation  of foreign  assets, rather  than 
an increase  in export  capacity. 
The  foundations  for export-promotion  policies in Asia and  for import- 526  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
substitution  policies in Latin America are political. It is crucial to 
understand  the political economy of export promotion in order to 
understand  the continuing  paralysis  of the Latin American  economies. 
In spite of an urgent  need to spur  exports  to grow out of the debt crisis, 
movements  toward  export promotion  in almost every Latin American 
country have been frustrated  recently by countervailing  movements 
toward  further  protection  of domestic industry.  Currency  devaluations 
that might  help exporters  have been accompanied  by discounts of the 
national currencies in black markets. The sharp divergences of the 
official  and black market  rates, which have not occurred  in Asia, often 
represent  an implicit  tax on exporters,  as I describe  below. The debate 
within  Latin  America  over whether  to repudiate  or repay  the debt  really 
involves two debates:  one between  the country  and  the foreign  commer- 
cial  banks  over the terms  of debt  repayment;  and  one within  the country, 
between export interests on one side and political interests tied to the 
current  import-substitution  regimes  on the other. 
This report  is divided  into three sections. In the first,  I examine  some 
of the leading hypotheses concerning  the Latin American-East  Asian 
economic  record  and  show  the  importance  of export  growth  in explaining 
the differential  performance  of the two regions. In the second section, I 
speculate  on some of the political  developments  that turned  the Asian 
economies toward  export promotion  and the Latin  American  countries 
toward  import  substitution.  The third  section  looks briefly  at the current 
political economy of trade in Latin America to show how political 
paralysis  is contributing  to the continued  economic paralysis. 
Explanations  for Performance  in East Asia and Latin America 
The debt crisis of the early 1980s  was triggered  by a combination  of 
global  economic  events and  domestic  developments  in the debtor  coun- 
tries. The best evidence for the contribution  of global events is the 
simultaneous  onset of the crisis  in more  than  forty  developing  countries. 
The best evidence for the role of distinctively  national  developments  is 
the success of many  debtor  countries  in surmounting  the external  shocks 
without  an emergency  debt rescheduling.  As already  indicated  in table 
1, the Latin American countries rescheduled, while the East Asian 
countries,  by and  large,  did not. Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  527 
Table  2. Terms-of-Trade  Shock, 1979-83a 
Percentage  Import share as 
change  in  percentage  of  Real  income  effect 
terms of trade  GDP,  1975-78  of terms-of-trade 
from  1975-78b  average  change 
Country  (1)  (2)  (3) =(1) x (2)1100 
Latin America 
Argentina  3  5.4c  0.2 
Brazil  - 29  7.8  -2.3 
Chile  - 27  17.7  -4.9 
Mexico  26  7.1  1.8 
Peru  -22  16.3  -3.7 
Venezuela  64  24.9  15.9 
Weighted  average  1.1  9.5  1.2 
Colombia  -18  10.7  - 2.0 
East Asia 
Indonesia  36  17.2  6.1 
Korea  -3  29.6  -0.9 
Malaysia  14  35.3  4.9 
Thailand  -  14  20.4  - 2.9 
Weighted  average  11.8  24.0  2.1 
Philippines  -  16  20.1  - 3.2 
Sources:  For  Brazil,  Colombia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and the  Philippines,  export  and  import unit  value 
indexes are taken from IMF, International Fitnatncial  Statistics.  For Chile, Peru, Venezuela,  and Indonesia,  the terms 
of trade for  1975-81  are taken from World Bank,  World Debt  Tables,  several  issues,  and then spliced  with data for 
1982-83  from World Bank,  World Development  Report  1984 and 1985 (World Bank,  1984 and  1985), table 9.  For 
Argentina, the data are from the World Bank.  For Mexico,  export and import price indexes  are calculated  as ratios 
of nominal values  to real values  (goods  and services).  Data are from Mexican National  Accounts.  The import share 
in  GDP  is  calculated  as  the  average  ratio  of  merchandise  imports  to  GDP  for  1975-78,  using  data  from  IMF, 
Intternational Fitnancial Statistics. 
a.  The terms of trade measure the price of exports  relative to imports. 
b.  Percentage  change in average terms of trade of  1979-83 relative to average of  1975-78. 
c.  1976-78. 
THE  ROLE  OF  EXTERNAL  SHOCKS 
The simplest explanation  for the differences in performance  is that 
the global shocks hit the Latin American  countries with greater  force. 
Two possibilities are often raised: first, that the commodity terms of 
trade deteriorated  more sharply in Latin America than in Asia, and, 
second, that the Latin American  countries had a higher  proportion  of 
debt in variable  interest rate loans, and thus felt the effect of rising  in- 
terest rates sooner. These hypotheses are considered  in tables 2 and 3. 
The first  column  of table 2 shows the change in the terms of trade  of 
the two regions  during  1979-83,  compared  with 1975-78.  On a weighted 
average basis (all regional averages shown throughout  the paper are |~~~~~~c  cq  ,c  _i  )  r-  *,  t  oN  C'szF 
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based on GDP weights  for 1975-80),4  the terms  of trade  actually  rose in 
both regions, but less sharply  in Latin America  than in Asia. Clearly, 
the terms of trade do not well explain "success"  and "failure" in 
handling  external debt in the early 1980s, since three of the six crisis 
cases in Latin America  enjoyed terms-of-trade  gains, while two of the 
four successful adjusters in Asia had terms-of-trade  declines. The 
improvement  in Latin  America  is not surprising,  in view of the fact that 
Mexico and Venezuela are major  oil exporters, while Argentina  and 
Peru  also export oil (the terms of trade  for all of these countries  except 
Peru improved during 1979-83). In Asia,  Indonesia is  a  major oil 
exporter.  Although  real oil prices fell in 1982-83, the decrease was not 
nearly  as large  as the increase  of the preceding  four years. Note that  the 
terms-of-trade  experience of Colombia  was below the Latin American 
average. 
In the third  column  of the table, the terms-of-trade  effect is measured 
as a share  of GDP  by multiplying  the change  in the terms  of trade  across 
the two periods  by the average  import  share  of GDP for each economy 
(shown  in the second column).  The product  of the terms-of-trade  change 
and  the import  share  is an  approximate  measure  of the real  income  effect, 
expressed  as a percentage  of GDP, of the terms-of-trade  change. Brazil, 
Chile,  and  Peru  fit  the common  perception  that  the Latin  debtors  suffered 
serious income losses from terms-of-trade  declines. In each case the 
losses exceed 2 percent  of GDP each year. On the other hand, Mexico 
and Venezuela  enjoyed  significant  terms-of-trade  improvements. 
These results are a bit surprising,  but they are consistent with the 
findings  of Donal  Donovan  and  Nuriel  Roubini,  who have compared  the 
magnitude  of terms-of-trade  shocks for a much  larger  sample  of middle- 
income  developing  countries.5  Both authors  found  that  the magnitude  of 
terms-of-trade  movements was not markedly different for groups of 
reschedulers  and nonreschedulers.  It should be noted that while the 
4. The GDP  weights  are  as follows. In Latin  America:  Argentina,  0.171;  Brazil,  0.385; 
Chile,  0.039;  Mexico,  0.278;  Peru,  0.028;  Venezuela,  0.099.  In  East  Asia:  Indonesia,  0.381; 
Korea, 0.327;  Malaysia,  0.121;  Thailand,  0.171. Note that Colombia  and the Philippines 
are  not included  in the regional  averages. 
5.  See Donal  J. Donovan,  "The  Sources  of External  Debt  Servicing  Difficulties:  Some 
Empirical  Evidence," DM/84/15  (International  Monetary  Fund, Exchange and Trade 
Relations  Department,  March 1984);  and Nuriel Roubini, "The Origins  and Causes of 
External  Debt Servicing  Difficulties,"  S-I paper  (International  Monetary  Fund, August 
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cumulative  terms-of-trade  movements  during  1978-83  were comparable 
for the two groups, Roubini  shows that  for the rescheduling  group, the 
terms  of trade  improved  more  during  1977-81  and then  fell more  during 
1981-83  than  it did  for the nonreschedulers.  This finding  seems to hinge 
on the heavy representation  of oil exporters  in the rescheduling  group. 
The second external shock of this period was the sustained rise in 
U.S. interest rates that began at the end of 1979. Higher  interest rates 
affected not only the costs of new borrowing, but also the interest 
charges on existing debt, since a significant  fraction of LDC debt was 
contracted  at variable  interest  rates. Typically, syndicated  commercial 
bank  loans tie interest  payments  to a short-term  dollar  rate, such as the 
London interbank  offer rate (LIBOR) or the U.S.  prime rate, on a 
quarterly  or semiannual  basis. The extent of borrowing at variable 
interest  rates  differs  widely across debtor  countries.  It is much  higher  in 
Latin  America  than  in Asia (with  the exception  of Korea),  since a higher 
fraction of the Asian debt is nonbank  borrowing, originating  instead 
from official creditors  such as export credit agencies of the developed 
countries. 
The implicit  nominal  interest rate paid by the various countries can 
be calculated  by dividing  total interest payments in any year into the 
total stock of debt. Ideally this should be done for a comprehensive 
measure  of the debt stock, but given the poor quality  of the available 
data, it can be done consistently only for the medium-  and long-term 
publicly guaranteed  debt of each country, as reported by the World 
Bank. Such implicit  rates are shown in the first  two columns  of table 3. 
Note that interest rates rise by at least 3 percentage  points in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, but rise by much smaller  magnitudes  in 
Asia. This  reflects  the higher  proportion  of commercial  bank  loans in the 
Latin American  debt stocks. Peru and Colombia  both rely heavily on 
official credits, often at concessional rates, and therefore show lower 
and  less variable  interest  rates than  do the other countries  in the region. 
For the Latin American countries and for Korea, it is possible to 
calculate  effective interest  rates  on a more  comprehensive  basis, includ- 
ing non-publicly guaranteed long-term debt and debt with original 
maturity  of less than one year. These more comprehensive  rates are 
shown in parentheses  in the table. Since most of the private debt and 
short-term  debt is at nonconcessional  rates, and therefore  closely tied 
to short-term  U.S. rates, the rise in the more  comprehensive  measure  is 
generally  greater  (though  not so in Venezuela). Jeffrey D. Sachs  531 
What  counts in terms  of debt servicing  burden,  of course, is the real 
interest  rate, rather  than  the nominal  interest  rate. It is a matter  of some 
delicacy  as to how to define  the relevant  real  rate  (ex ante  versus  ex post, 
and according to which inflation measure), and various theoretical 
derivations  suggest different  approaches.6  As a pragmatic  procedure,  I 
measure the real interest rate burden  relative to the (ex post) rate of 
increase of dollar  tradable  goods prices in each country. In principle, 
tradable  goods prices should be measured as a weighted average of 
export  prices  and  the prices  of import-competing  sectors. Since  the latter 
prices are not directly  observable, I use an average  export price index 
of the developed  economies  as a measure  of the import-competing  prices 
for  each  of the  debtor  countries.  For  each country,  the annual  percentage 
change in dollar tradable goods prices, p', is measured as 0.5 (px +  pm), 
where px is the export price index of the country, and pm is the proxy for 
import-competing  prices. The real interest  rate is then i -  p'. This own 
real rate of interest measure can be considered as exogenous to the 
country  in question,  and increases  in the real  rate  constitute  an external 
shock to the country. 
The real rate measures  are shown in the third  and fourth  columns  of 
table 3, and are based on the nominal  interest rates from the first and 
second columns. In some oil-exporting  countries, real interest rates 
actually  fall in 1979-83  relative  to 1976-78,  since the dollar  export  prices 
rise more rapidly.  Brazil  and Korea are the only two countries  to show 
very large  increases  in real  interest  rates, since only these countries  had 
large increases in nominal  interest rates combined with falling export 
prices. 
To measure  the interest  rate  shock as a proportion  of GDP, I multiply 
the change  in the real  interest  rate  across the two periods  by a debt-GDP 
ratio. An ideal measure  would require  a comprehensive  accounting  of 
the country's  foreign  assets (reserves,  capital  flight,  and  so forth)  as well 
as debts, and apply relevant  interest  rate changes to each class of asset 
and debt. Without  much  better  data, that  procedure  is not possible, so I 
fall back on a cruder measure. The foreign exchange reserves of the 
country  are subtracted  from a gross debt measure, and this net debt is 
6.  For two examples of theoretically  derived measures  of the interest burden, see 
Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Policy  and  Performance  Links  between  LDC  Debtors  and  Industrial 
Nations,"  BPEA,  this  issue;  and  Warwick  McKibbin  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Macroeconomic 
Policies in the OECD and LDC External  Adjustment,"  Working  Paper 1534  (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1985). 532  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
taken  as a fraction  of GDP  for the year 1980.  The change  in real  interest 
rates  is then multiplied  by this ratio, with the results shown in column  5 
(numbers  in parentheses  are calculated  based on the more comprehen- 
sive interest rate series). Note that the real interest rate shock is large 
and  negative  only for Brazil, Chile, and Korea.7 
In the final column of the table the terms-of-trade  and interest rate 
shocks are combined. The inescapable conclusion is that macroeco- 
nomic performance  and the need to reschedule  are not closely tied to 
the magnitude  of the external  shocks as a proportion  of GDP.  Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela had positive (that is, beneficial) net shocks. 
Korea  and Thailand,  on the other hand, had very large  negative shocks 
relative to GDP, but both maintained  strong economic performance. 
Part  of the answer  to this puzzle, we shall see, is that in Latin  America, 
the debt servicing  burden  became very large as a fraction of exports, 
though  not necessarily  large  relative  to GDP. 
THE  EXTENT  OF  FOREIGN  BORROWING 
It might  be supposed  that the Latin  American  debtors  have suffered 
far more because they borrowed  far more during  the 1970s. Consider 
first  the cumulative  current  account  deficit  for the various  countries. In 
a given  year,  the current  account  deficit  equals  the increase  in  a country's 
net liabilities  to foreigners,  subject  to an adjustment  for capital  gains  and 
losses on preexisting stocks of assets and liabilities. The cumulative 
deficit for the decade should then approximately  equal the increase in 
the country's  net liabilities  over the course of the decade. As shown in 
table  4, column  1, there  is a large  variation  in the extent  of net borrowing 
in both regions,  and  on average  the Latin  American  countries  borrowed 
only slightly  more. The variation  in net borrowing  within each region, 
compared  with the uniformity  of results, is striking.  In Latin America, 
Venezuela  ran  a cumulative  current  account  surplus,  and  Argentina  and 
Colombia  were approximately  in balance. The remaining  countries  ran 
sizable  cumulative  deficits.  In Asia, Indonesia  and Malaysia  maintained 
7. With an alternative  real interest rate measure, such as the nominal  interest rate 
minus  U.S. inflation,  the real  interest  rate  shock  is negative  for  all  countries,  but  of modest 
magnitude.  At the peak,  the measured  U.S. real  interest  rate  rises by about 10  percentage 
points  and  is multiplied  by a debt-GDP  ratio  on the order  of 20 percent,  producing  a peak 
annual  loss of about  2 percent  of GDP and an average  annual  loss of about 1 percent  of 
GDP. Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  533 






1970-80  Debt-GDP  Debt service 
(percentage  of  ratio,  Debt-export  ratio, 
Country  1981 GDP)  1981  ratio,  1981  1980-83 
Latin America 
Argentina  2.3  31.6  334.7  214.9 
Brazil  22.8  26.1  298.7  132.6 
Chile  19.8  47.6  290.0  153.3 
Mexico  13.9  30.9  258.8  161.8 
Peru  19.3  44.7  223.5  122.2 
Venezuela  -  7.5  42.1  134.0  117.8 
Weighted average  13.6  31.3  271.5  153.8 
Colombia  0.4  21.9  182.9  103.8 
East Asia 
Indonesia  0.6  24.1  87.1  n.a. 
Korea  24.6  27.6  76.6  90.1 
Malaysia  -  2.0  27.8  51.8  16.9 
Thailand  22.4  25.7  103.1  58.1 
Weighted average  11.9  25.9  82.1  61.7 
Philippines  18.3  40.6  214.6  152.7 
Sources:  Debt stocks are from the DRI International Data Base. The cumulative current account deficit is computed 
from  International  Financial  Statistics  data  and  is  divided  by  the  GDP  of  the  country  measured  at  the  official 
exchange  rate. Exports are from the national income account series for exports of goods and services  of Interntational 
Financial  Statistics. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The debt service  ratio equals total debt servicing expenditures  relative to exports.  Debt servicing equals interest 
payments  on  all debt,  plus amortization  of  principal on  medium- and long-term debt,  plus the stock  of  short-term 
debt (the principal of which,  by definition, comes  due within the year). Debt stocks  are end-of-year  total gross debt. 
approximate  balance, while Korea ran  up a larger  proportionate  deficit 
than did any of the other countries  in Asia or Latin America.  Thailand 
and the Philippines  also ran  large  current  account deficits in the 1970s. 
It is certainly hard  to see a strong link between the size of a nation's 
current  account  deficit  and  whether  it suffers  a debt crisis. 
The accumulation  of gross external debt can exceed the current 
account deficit if the private sector accumulates  foreign assets.8 One 
typical situation  is that the private  sector converts domestic assets into 
8. Given the definition  of debt that is used in this table  and in other  discussion  of the 
debt crisis, there  are several  points  of slippage  between  current  account  deficits  and  debt 
accumulation.  Debt is generally  defined  as including  only fixed-income  securities, not 
equities  or foreign  direct  investment.  Thus, a current  account  deficit  that is financed  by 
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foreign  assets in expectation  of a devaluation.  The central  bank  supports 
the domestic currency,  before the devaluation  actually  takes place, by 
selling  the foreign  assets to the private  sector. In many, though  not all, 
Latin  American  countries,  gross debt  accumulation  was in fact substan- 
tially above the cumulative  current  account deficit, particularly  in the 
period 1978-82, as is evident from a comparison  of the first  and second 
columns of the table. Note, for example, that in Argentina,  Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela, the gross debt, which could not have been large 
relative to 1981  GDP before 1970, is vastly larger  than the cumulative 
current account deficits for the decade of  the  1970s. Independent 
evidence, marshaled  by me  and  by others,  has shown  that  these countries 
indeed  experienced  enormous,  though  difficult  to measure,  capital  flight 
in the late 1970s  and early 1980s.9  The table also provides evidence of 
capital outflow from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines,  though 
little capital  outflow  from Korea and Thailand.  In the case of Indonesia 
and  Malaysia,  much  of that  outflow  appears  to be the routine  repatriation 
of overseas Chinese  profits  to Hong Kong and Singapore.  In the case of 
the Philippines,  there  was a significant  flight  of capital  in the wake of the 
political  and  economic upheaval  caused by the Aquino  assassination. 
The accumulation  of gross debt is a reflection  both  of current  account 
deficits and of capital flight. As shown in table 4, the Latin American 
countries  in  fact  accumulated  slightly  more  debt, as a proportion  of GDP, 
than did the Asian nations. The difference  becomes much more signifi- 
cant  only when  debt  is expressed  as a percentage  of exports,  as in  column 
3. The higher  ratio  of debt to exports is most likely the critical  factor in 
making  Latin  America  so vulnerable  to the external  shocks of the early 
1980s. 
The contrast between the two regions becomes decisive when the 
debt service to export  ratios  are  compared  in column  4. The debt service 
measure  is taken  at its most comprehensive  level: interest  payments  on 
typically  measured.  Second, the debt is measured  gross, rather  than  net. Thus, debt can 
rise  even with  current  account  balance  and  no increase  in private  sector  holdings  of foreign 
assets  if the  government  uses the  foreign  borrowing  to accumulate  official  foreign  exchange 
reserves. 
9.  See, for example, my comments  on Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Latin American 
Debt: I Don't Think  We Are in Kansas Anymore,"  BPEA, 2:1984,  pp. 335-403. Direct 
evidence  for  capital  flight  is found  in the increase  in U.S. bank  liabilities  to Latin  American 
residents  during  1979-82.  Such a large  increase  is not apparent  for the Asian economies. 
See also "Latin  America:  The Other  Side of Debt," Economist,  June  23, 1984,  pp. 73-74. Jeffrey D. Sachs  535 
debt of all maturities,  plus amortization  of principal  on medium-  and 
long-term  debt, plus complete repayment  of all short-term  debt. The 
results  are  striking,  in  that  in Latin  America,  debt  servicing  requirements 
exceeded total exports, on average, in the years 1980-83, while in Asia 
(with the notable  exception of the Philippines),  the debt servicing was 
well below the level of exports. The higher  ratio  in Latin  America  is due 
to a combination  of factors  already  discussed:  higher  debt-export  ratios; 
a higher  concentration  of debt  in short  maturities;  and  a higher  effective 
interest  rate  on the debt, because of its concentration  in variable  interest 
rate  bank  claims  rather  than  fixed interest  rate  official  credits. 
With debt servicing  ratios above 100 percent, it was impossible  for 
the Latin American countries to service their debts fully when new 
lending  dropped  off in 1982.  Debt reschedulings  became  inevitable.  The 
slowdown in lending  itself resulted  from several factors: concern over 
economic mismanagement  in the debtor  countries;  tight  monetary  con- 
ditions in the creditor countries; and the self-fulfilling  fragility  of the 
Latin  American  debt structure  in light  of the extraordinary  debt service 
ratios. When each lender recognizes that a country will be unable to 
service its debt if the other lenders stop making  loans, a "panic" or 
"run"  on the country  becomes possible, as each lender  attempts  to take 
out its assets ahead  of the other claimants.  '0 With  debt service ratios in 
excess of 100  percent, it is easy to see how such a run  can occur. 
TRADE  POLICIES  AND  EXCHANGE  RATE  MANAGEMENT 
Models of optimal borrowing  show that capital-scarce  developing 
countries can profitably  borrow over the long term, but only if the 
borrowed  resources are invested sufficiently  in the tradable  goods that 
ultimately  will  be used to service  the accumulated  foreign  debt. (Borrow- 
ing in the short  run  can be fruitful  for smoothing  consumption  over time 
in the face of temporary  external  shocks, even if the borrowed  funds  are 
not used to augment  investment in tradables.)" Over time, as debt is 
10. For a formal  analysis of a "panic," see Jeffrey Sachs, "Theoretical  Issues in 
International  Borrowing," Princeton Studies in International  Finance 54 (Princeton 
University,  International  Finance  Section, 1984). 
11. For  a theoretical  discussion  of optimal  borrowing  that  details  the role  of tradables 
versus nontradables  and the role of consumption  versus investment, see Richard  N. 
Cooper  and  Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "Borrowing  Abroad:  The  Debtor's  Perspective,"  in  Gordon 
W. Smith and John T. Cuddington, eds.,  International Debt  and Developing  Countries 
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accumulated,  the price  of tradable  goods should  rise relative  to nontrad- 
able goods, to encourage  the movement  of resources into the tradable 
goods sectors. Moreover,  investment  in tradables  should be in sectors 
that  are  profitable  when  outputs  and  inputs  are  evaluated  at world  prices, 
rather  than tariff-distorted  prices. In a classic paper, Richard  Brecher 
and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro  showed that national income will decline 
when  foreign  capital  inflows  are attracted  by high  rates  of return  that  are 
induced  by tariff  protection.  12 The following  evidence suggests that the 
Latin  American  economies have violated  both dicta  in recent years. 
It is not easy to get good measures  of the size of the tradables  sectors 
over time. Trade  data  reveal the extent of actual  trade,  not the value, at 
world prices, of production in internationally  traded commodities. 
Moreover,  without  intensive development  of sector-level data, it is not 
possible to evaluate  the returns,  at world  market  prices, of investments 
in various sectors of an economy. The typical recourse, as in the first 
three  columns  of table  5, is simply  to measure  the extent  of actual  exports 
relative  to total income  to get an estimate  for the growth  of the tradables 
sector. Though  admittedly  imperfect,  the data  strongly  indicate  the rapid 
growth of exports relative to GDP in East Asia since 1965, compared 
with a fairly  flat pattern  in Latin America.  In 1965,  the Korean  export- 
GDP  share  was only 9 percent,  the Indonesian  share  5 percent,  evidence 
that  the recent high  openness of these countries  is a development  of the 
past two decades, rather  than  a fixed  feature  of the economies. By 1983, 
the large debtor countries in Latin America (Argentina,  Brazil, and 
Mexico)  had  a significantly  smaller  export  base relative  to GDP  than  did 
the Asian countries. 
Another  rough  indicator  of the extent of the tradables  sector can be 
gleaned  from  data that divide production  and employment  into agricul- 
ture,  industry,  and  services. The  tradables  sector  is often  loosely equated 
with agriculture  and industry,  the nontradables  sector with services. In 
the absence of extensive trade barriers,  this division is plausible. (In 
cases where industry  is heavily protected, some industrial  sectors will 
be counted  as tradable  even though  their  outputs  are not in competition 
with imported  goods from abroad,  and their  output  prices are substan- 
tially above world market  levels, a practice that makes the traditional 
12. See Richard  A. Brecher  and Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Tariffs,  Foreign  Capital 
and  Immiserizing  Growth,"  Journal ofInternational  Economics,  vol. 7 (November  1977), 
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Table 5.  Comparisons of Industrial Structure, Selected Years 
Percent 
Share of labor  force 
Share of exports  in GDP  in services 
Country  1965  1983  Change  1965  1981  Change 
Latin  America 
Argentina  8  13  5  48  59  11 
Brazil  8  8  0  34  46  12 
Chile  14  24  10  53  62  9 
Mexico  9  20  11  29  38  9 
Peru  16  21  5  31  41  10 
Venezuela  31  26  -  5  46  55  9 
Weighted average  11  15  4  37  47  11 
Colombia  11  10  -  1  35  53  18 
East Asia 
Indonesia  5  25  20  20  30  10 
Korea  9  37  28  29  37  8 
Malaysia  44  54  10  27  34  7 
Thailand  18  22  4  13  15  2 
Weighted average  13  32  19  23  30  8 
Philippines  17  20  3  27  37  10 
Source:  World Development  Report 1985, tables 5 and 21. 
division  less useful.) Columns  4-6 show the evolution  of the labor  force 
in the service sector for the two regions.  The data  suggest  that  the Latin 
American countries have a much larger service sector, and hence 
presumably  a much larger  nontraded  goods sector, than do the Asian 
economies, and  that  the growth  of the service sector since 1965  has been 
faster in Latin America (11 percentage points on a weighted average 
basis) than  in East Asia (8 percentage  points). It is important  to remem- 
ber, however, that  these data  likely  understate  the differences  in the two 
regions  by counting  heavily  protected  Latin  American  industries  as part 
of the tradables  base of the economy. 
The allocation of resources between tradables and nontradables 
depends on trade policies, exchange rate management,  and aggregate 
demand  management.  In considering  the relative contribution  of each, 
it is important  to work within a framework  of at least three sectors: 
importables,  exportables, and nontradables.  The three-sector frame- 
work  helps to guard  against  an unnecessary  and incorrect  simplification 
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model of international  trade. In the two-sector model, all policies that 
protect the import-competing  sector necessarily hurt the exporting 
sector. Protectionism  is anti-export  biased, since resources pulled into 
importables  must  come  from  exportables.  In  the  three-sector  framework, 
it is immediately  evident that protectionist  policies can go hand  in hand 
with  export-promoting  policies if  resources  are  drawn  from  nontradables 
into both the tradable  sectors. In fact, the export-promotion  policies 
of Korea,  Japan,  and  to a lesser extent  Indonesia  have  had  this  character: 
exports have grown rapidly at the same time that import-competing 
sectors have been protected. In Latin America,  on the other hand, the 
more  traditional  anti-export  bias  of protectionism  has been present.  The 
combination  of expansionary  demand  policies, protected import-com- 
peting  sectors, and overvalued  currencies  has meant  that  both importa- 
bles and nontradables  have benefited at the expense of exportables. 
Since the history  of the long-term  trade  policies in the two regions  is well 
documented,  exchange  rate management  dominates  the discussion  that 
follows. 13 
The management  of exchange rates, like the management  of trade 
policies, can have complex and differential  effects on all three sectors, 
particularly  if there are multiple  exchange rates or a significant  black 
market  premium  on the purchase  of foreign  exchange.  The simplest  case 
is a currency with a unified and fixed exchange rate that is freely 
convertible  on current  account  transactions,  so that  no black  market  for 
current  transactions  exists. Suppose that, starting  from an initial zero 
overall balance  of payments, a government  initiates  a money-financed 
fiscal  expansion.  The expansion  will tend  to worsen  both  the current  and 
capital accounts, and will therefore put downward pressure on the 
currency. The central bank will be forced to sell foreign exchange 
reserves to stabilize  the rate. At the same time, nontradables  prices will 
rise under  the pressure  of increased  demand,  while tradables  prices will 
be held down by foreign  competition  (importable  sectors protected  by 
quota  restrictions  will behave  effectively  as nontradables,  and  should  be 
classified as such). The real value of the currency, measured as the 
13. All studies  have confirmed  the anti-export  bias of trade  policies  in Latin  America 
relative  to Asia. The  classic study  is Bela  Balassa  and  associates,  Development  Strategies 
in Semi-Industrial  Economies  (Johns  Hopkins  University  Press, 1982).  See also Ching- 
yuan  Lin, "Latin  America  and  East  Asia," for  a comprehensive  treatment  of the evidence 
on effective  protection  in several  Latin  American  and  Asian  economies. Jeffrey D. Sachs  539 
foreign  consumer  price level converted  by the exchange  rate relative  to 
domestic consumer prices, will tend to appreciate. Resources will be 
pulled into the nontradable  sector and out of both of the tradables 
sectors. In addition, nontradables  profitability  will rise, the real con- 
sumption wage of urban workers will likely increase, and tradables 
profitability  will decline. The political battle over whether to restrain 
demand  and  devalue  the currency  will pit urban  workers  and businesses 
in nontradables  and quota-protected  sectors against  firms  and workers 
(assuming  they are only semimobile)  in sectors exposed to international 
competition,  such as agriculture  and manufacturing  exporters. 
The situation  is more complicated  when the central  bank  is not only 
unwilling  or unable to sell reserves in order to peg the exchange rate, 
but also unwilling to change the official parity. In such a case, the 
currency  becomes partially  inconvertible  on current  account transac- 
tions, since the central  bank  must ration  the sale of foreign  exchange  at 
the official exchange rate. In such a system, exporters are typically 
obligated  to sell their foreign exchange earnings  at the official  price to 
the central  bank within a limited  period. The central  bank then resells 
these export proceeds, plus a policy-determined  level of reserves, to 
importers  at the official  parity. Those individuals  and firms  at the front 
of the central bank queue are able to get the foreign exchange at the 
official  price; individuals  and firms  at the end of the queue are rationed, 
and are typically forced to turn to an illegal black market or a legal 
parallel  market,  in which  foreign  currencies  sell at a premium  relative  to 
the official  rate. (I will henceforth  use the term "black market"  for this 
side market,  though  in many countries  this market  is either  partially  or 
wholly legal.) 
A crucial  question  in such a system is whether  the official  rate or the 
black  market  rate  represents  the marginal  cost of funds  for a given class 
of imports. For example, if all pharmaceuticals  can automatically  be 
imported  at the official rate, then the official rate will be the marginal 
cost of foreign exchange. On the other hand, if spare parts must be 
bought  using  black  market  funds, then  the black  market  price  will be the 
marginal  cost of funds. In some cases, the black  market  is used only for 
capital  account  transactions,  with  foreign  exchange  being  freely  available 
at the official  parity  for all or most current  account transactions.  More 
commonly, though, a wide range of imports, and often imports  across 
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Domestic prices of importables  then rise above world market prices 
converted to domestic currency units at the official, but unavailable, 
exchange rate. In that case, the black market  premium  is akin to an 
import  tariff,  since the premium  measures  the excess cost of importables 
relative to  exportables.'4 The black market premium then attracts 
resources into import-competing  sectors, since the domestic price of 
such  goods includes  the black  market  premium,  and  out of nontradables 
and  exportables. 
Consider  the effect of a demand expansion starting  from an initial 
balance  of payments  equilibrium  under  this new exchange rate regime. 
Once again  the price of nontradables  will tend to rise, while downward 
pressure will be put on the exchange rate. However, now the central 
bank responds by rationing  foreign exchange, with the result that the 
black  market  premium  on foreign  currencies  rises. This secondary  effect 
punishes exporters at the expense of importers.  Overall, the demand 
expansion  induces a real currency  appreciation  measured  at the official 
exchange  rate, a rise in the black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange, 
a rise in nontradables  production, and a sharp drop in exportables 
production. The  effect  on  import-competing  goods  is  ambiguous. 
The anti-export  bias of a black market  premium  is one of the two 
principal income distributional  effects of a split exchange rate. The 
second effect involves the way in which the central bank rations the 
foreign exchange that it in fact sells at the official exchange rate. 
Recipients  of scarce  foreign  exchange  at preferred  prices  clearly  receive 
a windfall,  akin  to the earnings  that  privileged  importers  earn  under  trade 
quotas. In most of Latin  America, scarce foreign  exchange is allocated 
to protected  industrial  firms  that use the foreign exchange to purchase 
primary  inputs from abroad. The value of the rents attached to these 
inexpensive  purchases  can be several  percent  of GNP, and  are clearly  a 
major  political  obstacle  to any  attempt  to devalue  and  unify  the exchange 
rate. 
Data on exchange rate management  shown in table 6 suggest that 
Latin  American  currencies,  measured  at official  parities,  became over- 
14. Exportables  will sometimes  be smuggled  in response  to the incentive  created  by 
the black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange.  Since smuggling  is likely  to involve both 
private  costs (for example,  bribes)  and social costs (for example,  roundabout  transport), 
even the smuggling  exporter  will not receive, on net, the black  market  exchange  rate  for 
his sales. Jeffrey D. Sachs  541 
Table 6.  Exchange Rate Management, Selected Periodsa 
Percent 
Real  Black market  premium 
appreciation,  on currency 
1979-81  over  on___  cl__r____ency  _ 
Country  1976-78  1977-81  1982-83 
Latin America 
Argentina  36.9  10.7  36.0 
Brazil  -  20.5  16.9  51.8 
Chile  7.5  6.1  29.6 
Mexico  13.3  2.4  32.7 
Peru  -  7.2  5.0  1.0 
Venezuela  7.0  0.2  ...  b 
Weighted average  2.9  9.4  40.4 
Colombia  10.4  0.9  6.9 
East Asia 
Indonesia  -  29.7  2.3  9.1 
Korea  3.8  9.0  10.0 
Malaysia  -4.6  0.1  0.5 
Thailand  1.0  -  0.7  0.5 
Weighted average  -  10.5  3.7  6.9 
Philippines  6.7  6.8  16.2 
Sources:  Official exchange  rates and price data are from Internatiotnal Financial  Statistics,  series ae and 64; black 
market rates  (or parallel market rates)  are from 1984 World Currency  Yearbook (International Currency Analysis, 
Inc.,  1984). 
a.  The  real exchange  rate is calculated  for each  year as EP*IP,  where  E is the official exchange  rate in units of 
domestic  currency per dollar, P* is the U.S.  consumer  price index,  and P is the domestic  price index.  All variables 
are  annual  averages.  The  black  nmarket  premium  is  computed  for  the  months  of  March,  June,  September,  and 
December,  using official rates and the black market rates.  Annual average premiums are then computed. 
b.  Not  comparable  for Venezuela,  since  in the  split  exchange  rate  system  operating  since  1983, nontraditional 
exports are sold at the parallel market rate, and hence are subsidized.  However,  private sector nontraditional exports 
represent less  than 3 percent of total exports. 
valued (with the notable exception of Brazil's and Peru's) in the late 
1970s  and  early  1980s,  and  that  Latin  American  countries  have  frequently 
allowed very large  premiums  to develop in the black market  in the face 
of downward  pressure on the official exchange rate. Column 1 of the 
table  measures  the real  appreciation  of selected currencies  during  1979- 
81 compared  with a base period of 1976-78. The largest appreciation 
recorded  is that  of Argentina  (36.9 percent),  followed by Mexico, Chile, 
and Venezuela. Measured  by relative consumer price indexes (CPIs), 
Brazil in fact had a hefty real depreciation,  Peru a somewhat smaller 
one. In  Asia, all  countries  except Indonesia  maintained  the  real  exchange 
rate within 10 percent of the  1976-78 values. Moreover, the Latin 
American countries have allowed large black market premiums to 542  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
develop in recent years, particularly  after the onset of the debt crisis, 
while the Asian countries have generally  kept small the discrepancies 
between the official  and black market  rates. 
There  are several reasons for the real appreciation  throughout  Latin 
America,  but  I suggest  later  that  common  political  developments  leading 
to such appreciations,  and to their persistence  for several years, are at 
work.  In  terms  of proximate  causes, it is necessary  to distinguish  between 
the two Southern  Cone countries included  in the table, Argentina  and 
Chile, and the two major oil exporters, Mexico and Venezuela. The 
story  in the Southern  Cone is by now well known:  Argentina,  Chile, and 
Uruguay  all embarked  upon  a path  of disinflation,  with  a strong  currency 
policy helping  to reduce inflationary  expectations.15 In Mexico, and in 
Venezuela to a lesser extent, the real appreciation  resulted from oil- 
induced  increases  in domestic  spending  that  crowded  out tradable  goods 
sectors, 'a  la the "Dutch  disease.  " 
It  is worth  noting  that  the  Asian  policy  of maintaining  the real  exchange 
rate  has been extended  to encompass  a basket  of currencies,  rather  than 
focusing exclusively on the bilateral  rate with the U.S. dollar. During 
the years when the Bretton  Woods system was in effect, and  for several 
years after its demise, the Asian economies maintained  fixed rates 
against  the dollar. However, by 1978,  all of the countries  in the region 
were worried about the large fluctuation  of the dollar vis-'a-vis  other 
industrial  country currencies. In rapid succession, Thailand, Korea, 
Indonesia,  and Malaysia  all switched  from a dollar  peg to an exchange 
rate basket. In Latin  America,  on the other hand, no country  adopted  a 
basket. All continued  to peg to the U.S. dollar, either  at a fixed parity, 
as in Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile after 1979,  or in a crawling  peg, as 
in Argentina,  Brazil, Colombia,  and Peru. All suffered,  to some extent 
inadvertently,  when the dollar  appreciated  sharply  after 1980. 
THE  ROLE  OF  GOVERNMENT  FISCAL  POLICIES 
Overall  domestic  fiscal  policies are alleged  to have contributed  to the 
Latin American  debt crisis in at least two ways. First, some supply- 
15. For an excellent retrospective,  complete  with extensive references,  see Vittorio 
Corbo,  Jaime  de Melo, and  James  Tybout, "What  Went  Wrong  with  the Recent  Reforms 
in the Southern Cone," Discussion Paper (World Bank, July 1985), forthcoming  in 
Economic Development  and Cultural Change. Jeffrey D. Sachs  543 
siders  argue  that  successful  performance  has resulted  from  low marginal 
tax rates;  failure,  from high rates. For several years under  the Reagan 
administration,  U. S. policy at the International  Monetary  Fund  has  been 
to push  adjustment  programs  toward  expenditure  cutting  rather  than  tax 
increases  as the means  of reducing  budget  deficits  in countries  undertak- 
ing stabilization  programs.  In Congress, Jack Kemp and others have 
argued  for tying U.S. foreign aid to tax cuts in recipient  countries. A 
second, and more conventional, allegation  is that the Latin American 
governments have run larger budget deficits and, on balance, more 
expansionary  fiscal policies than have their Asian counterparts.  The 
results  of such fiscal  expansion  supposedly  include  both higher  inflation 
and  a diversion  of resources  into nontradables. 
It is not easy to collect evidence on the marginal  tax rates of a large 
sample of countries. One recent and widely cited study at the World 
Bank, by Keith Marsden,  has therefore  looked at average  tax revenues 
in GDP, to see if there is a negative correlation  between average tax 
rates and economic performance  across countries.  Marsden  concluded 
that such a negative  effect was evident.16 The evidence on average  tax 
rates in Latin America, however, casts strong doubts on the simple 
proposition  that these countries have overtaxed their private sectors. 
To the contrary,  many  Latin  American  countries,  particularly  Argentina 
and  Mexico, appear  to have a difficult  time  raising  sufficient  government 
revenues through  normal  tax collection, and so have resorted  to infla- 
tionary  money printing  to finance  state expenditure.  The first  column  of 
table 7 records the level of taxes as a proportion  of GDP for the two 
regions in 1982, and the second, the annual collection of seignorage 
"taxes" due to money creation,  on average, for 1975-83. With  respect 
to central  government  revenues, there  is strong  diversity  within  the two 
regions  and  no clear  pattern  between regions. However, with respect  to 
the inflation  tax, shown in the second column, only the Latin  American 
economies have made  significant  use of this form  of revenue  collection. 
In Asia, average  annual  seignorage  is everywhere  below 2.0 percent  of 
GDP. 
Just  as tax-GDP  ratios  are  widely variable  within  the regions,  with no 
strong  pattern  across regions, so too with central  government  expendi- 
16. Keith  Marsden,  "Links between  Taxes and Economic  Growth:  Some Empirical 
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Table 7.  Indicators of Fiscal Positiona 
Seignorage  Government 
Revenues  as  collection  as  expenditures as 
percentage  of  percentage  of  percentage  of 
Country  GDP,  1982  GDP,  1975-83  GNP,  1982 
Latin America 
Argentina  16.5  10.8  21.6 
Brazil  26.1  2.2  21.8 
Chile  32.0  2.5  37.6 
Mexico  17.0  5.5  31.7 
Peru  16.8  5.7  18.0 
Venezuela  29.3  1.8  29.6 
Weighted average  22.2  4.6  25.8 
Colombia  11.7  2.7  14.0 
East Asia 
Indonesia  22.2  1.3  23.5 
Korea  19.1  1.5  19.5 
Malaysia  29.2  1.6  41.0 
Thailand  13.9  1.0  19.9 
Weighted average  20.6  1.4  23.7 
Philippines  11.2  1.1  12.2 
Sources:  Fiscal  data are from  World Developmenit Report  1985.  Reserve  money  (series  14) and GDP  are from 
Internatiotial Financial  Statistics. 
a.  Revenues  and expenditures  are for the  central government.  Seignorage  as  a percentage  of GDP for year t is 
calculated  as (Mt -  Mt -)/GDPt,  where Mt is end-of-year  reserve  money  and GDP is nominal GDP for the year. 
tures  as a percentage  of GDP. It is not the case, as evidenced  in the third 
column  of the table, that public sector spending  is notably  less in Asia 
than in Latin America. Economic success is not a simple outturn  of a 
small  public  sector. 
A more  likely  factor  in Latin  American  problems  is the size of budget 
deficits, not the size of government  per se. However, it is remarkably 
difficult  to obtain cross-country  budget-deficit  data that are both con- 
sistent and reliable. Several  formidable  problems  must be overcome in 
making  deficit  comparisons.  Published  data  (for  example,  in the Govern- 
ment Financial Statistics of the International  Monetary Fund) rely 
almost exclusively on the central  government  net of state enterprises. 
Yet it is widely appreciated  that state enterprises  have accounted  for a 
significant  portion  of consolidated  government  deficits in recent years. 
Moreover,  meaningful  deficit  comparisons  should  correct  for  accounting 
biases introduced  by inflation.  For example, a switch from unindexed 
government  liabilities  to indexed government  liabilities  would greatly Jeffrey D. Sachs  545 
reduce measured deficits under the accounting conventions of most 
countries. Without comprehensive data on the structure of internal 
indebtedness  of a government,  it is not possible to make an adequate 
inflation  adjustment.  Another problem is that different definitions  of 
taxation and borrowing  can heavily skew the measured deficit. For 
example,  in Malaysia,  enormous  deficits  are  financed  by a forced  savings 
scheme that most countries would regard  as a form of social security 
taxation.  In Malaysia  it is seen as borrowing,  not taxation. 
Nuriel  Roubini  has recently  overcome at least one of these problems 
by constructing  deficits for the consolidated  public sectors, including 
both  central  governments  and  state enterprises,  for nineteen  developing 
countries, including  many in Latin America and Asia. His results are 
reproduced  in table 8. In his sample, there is a clear pattern  of higher 
deficits  among  the rescheduling  countries  in the years leading  up to the 
reschedulings.  Given  the large  weights  of Asia and Latin  America  in the 
sample, there is a suggestion  that the Latin American  deficits have in 
fact been larger.  That finding  would also be consistent with the higher 
inflation  and seignorage  taxation  already  observed. 
THE  ROLE  OF  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  PRODUCTION  PROCESS 
Many  commentators  have argued  that  it is not taxes or deficits  per se, 
but rather the degree of government intervention, that explains the 
difference  in performance  in Asia and Latin  America.  Not surprisingly, 
Milton Friedman  has strongly endorsed this view: "Every successful 
country  [Taiwan,  South  Korea,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  Japan]  has  relied 
primarily  on private enterprise  and free markets  to achieve economic 
development.  Every country  in trouble  has relied  primarily  on govern- 
ment  to guide  and  direct  its economic  development.  " 17  However strong 
the temptation  to regard  the Asian performance  as a victory for free 
enterprise, the historical record belies such a simple interpretation. 
Ching-yuan  Lin argues  persuasively  that, with the possible exception of 
Hong Kong, the Asian experience is not one of an unfettered  market 
economy, but rather one of enlightened policy activism of national 
governments:  "The  institutional  framework  of Taiwan  and South  Korea 
17. Milton  Friedman,  " 'No' to More Money for the IMF," Newsweek  (November 
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Table 8.  Fiscal Deficits Relative to GDP, 1977-83a 
Percent 
Nineteen  market borrower countries 
With recent  Without debt 
debt servicing  servicing  All nineteen 
Year  problems  problems  countries 
Central governmentfiscal  balances 
1977  -  2.8  -  1.9  -  2.5 
1978  -  2.8  -  1.7  -  2.4 
1979  -  1.2  -2.0  -  1.5 
1980  -2.2  -  1.8  -2.1 
1981  -  4.4  -  4.6  -  4.5 
1982  -5.7  -5.3  -  5.5 
1983  -6.1  -4.0  -  5.2 
Nonfinancial  public sector fiscal  balances 
1977  -4.1  -3.9  -4.0 
1978  -6.1  -3.4  -5.1 
1979  -  5.7  -  3.2  -  4.7 
1980  -  5.4  -  3.4  -  4.7 
1981  -  11.5  -5.8  -9.5 
1982  -  15.2  -6.9  -  12.1 
1983  -  12.4  -  5.8  -  9.8 
Source:  Nuriel Roubini, "The Origins and Causes of External Debt Servicing Difficulties,"  S-l paper (IMF, August 
1985), table  12. 
a.  Averages  of country data weighted  by U.S.  dollar value of GDP in each year. 
can hardly be characterized as laissez-faire.  .  .  . Through a timely and 
active promotion  of exports and industrial  efficiency, the authorities  in 
Taiwan and South Korea nevertheless helped to create a sustainable 
growth pattern based on their dynamic comparative  advantages."'18 
Colin Bradford  has recently reached the same conclusion in a very 
useful, well-referenced  study.  19 
Recent empirical  work by R.P. Short  makes it possible to assess the 
relative roles of state enterprise  in the two regions.20  According  to the 
data reproduced in table 9,  there is  no strong evidence that state 
18. See Ching-yuan  Lin, "Latin  America  and  East Asia," chapter  2. 
19. See Colin Bradford,  "East Asian Development  Strategies  as Models for Devel- 
opment,"  in  John  P.  Lewis,  ed.,  Development  Strategies:  A  New  Synthesis  (New 
Brunswick:  Transaction  Books, forthcoming). 
20. See R.P. Short, "The Role of Public Enterprise:  An International  Statistical 
Comparison,"  in Robert H.  Floyd  and others,  Public  Enterprise in Mixed Economies: 
Some Macroeconomic  Aspects  (IMF, 1984). Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  547 
Table 9.  The Macroeconomic Role of Public Enterprise, Selected Years 
Percent 
Share  of  Deficit  as 
Share  of  fixed  percentage 
Country  Year  GDP  investment  of GDP 
Latin America 
Argentina  1978-80  4.6  19.6  n.a. 
Brazil  1980  n.a.  22.8  1.7 
Chile  1978-80  13.0  12.9  0.4 
Mexico  1978  n.a.  29.4  3.7 
Peru  1978-79  n.a.  14.8  1.7 
Venezuela  1978-80  27.5  36.3  5.1 
Colombia  1978-80  n.a.  8.9  n.a. 
East Asia 
Korea  1974-77  6.4  25.1  5.2a 
Taiwan  1978-80  13.5  32.4  5.5 
Thailand  1978-79  n.a.  12.8  2.0 
Philippines  1978  n.a.  10.9  n.a. 
Source:  All data are from R.P.  Short,  "The Role of Public Enterprise: An International Statistical  Comparison," 
in Robert H.  Floyd and others,  Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies:  Some  Macroeconomic  Aspects  (IMF,  1984), 
pp.  110-96.  Indonesia data were not available. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  1978-80. 
enterprise  plays a more important  role in Latin America  than in Asia. 
Both Korea and Taiwan  allocate an enormous share of national  fixed 
capital  formation  through  state enterprise,  indeed  a higher  share  than  in 
any of the Latin American countries except Mexico and Venezuela, 
where government  investment  in the oil sector is heavy. Similarly,  the 
share of GDP originating  in state enterprises  is apparently  greater in 
Korea  and  Taiwan  than  in Argentina. 
To the extent  that  differences  in government  intervention  have  played 
a large role in explaining  economic performance,  the differences are 
apparently  in the quality of policy rather than the sheer weight of 
government  in the economy. 
A  SUMMARY 
Of all the causes of poor Latin American economic performance 
considered so far, the most significant  seem to be trade and exchange 
rate policies. Put simply, the Latin debt became burdensome both 
because of its structure  (short maturities, variable interest rate) and 548  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
because of insufficient  exports available  to service it. After  a decade of 
rapid  foreign  borrowing,  too many of Latin America's resources were 
in the nonexporting  sector, or abroad.  When a financial  squeeze in the 
early 1980s  caused banks to draw in their loans, the only way that the 
Latin countries  could maintain  debt servicing  was through  a recession 
and a sharp  reduction  in imports  combined  with debt reschedulings. 
Capital  flight,  high  inflation,  and, perhaps,  larger  public  deficits  have 
also contributed to  Latin America's poor performance, in part by 
exacerbating  the bias against  exportables. There is little evidence that 
excessive current  account  deficits  or excessively large  public  sectors or 
state enterprises  played  a leading  role. 
The Political Economy of Export-Led Growth 
Whatever  the abstract  merits  of an  export-promotion  strategy  relative 
to an import-substitution  strategy for an economy with little foreign 
debt, the Latin American  economies will need a dramatic  increase in 
exports if they are both to grow and to service their external  debts. A 
continuation of policies opposed to  export growth will make debt 
servicing impossible or will condemn these countries to many further 
years of stagnation,  or both. In the past thirty  years, most of the Latin 
American  economies have accomplished  about as much as possible in 
the way of import  substitution,  with current  imports  limited  to primary 
inputs  and  drastically  reduced  levels of capital  goods. As Diaz-Alejandro 
has noted, the trade surpluses  needed to generate  foreign exchange to 
service the external debt have so far been achieved through drastic 
reductions  in imports,  in turn  the product  of deep recessions in the Latin 
American economies.21  Economic growth will require increases in 
imports of capital goods, which must be financed through increased 
export sales. 
The  debate  over debt  repayments  in Latin  America  is being  conducted 
not only between debtor  countries  and international  creditors,  but also 
between factions in each country  that  would benefit  or lose from  a shift 
to export promotion.  Workers  whose real wages would be reduced  by 
an export-promoting  devaluation  of the currency,  and state enterprises 
21. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Latin  American  Debt." Jeffrey D. Sachs  549 
that  enjoy cheap  foreign  inputs  at the overvalued  official  exchange  rate, 
argue that debt repayments  represent an unconscionable  levy on the 
country  by foreigners  and must not be paid. Agricultural  interests and 
exporters of nontraditional  exports argue instead that the economy 
should  be liberalized  and the currency  devalued. As the final  section of 
the paper  shows, this debate has paralyzed  economic policy in most of 
the Latin  American  countries  since 1982. 
A growing literature  in international  trade theory has developed a 
political economy of protectionism  and rent-seeking  that uses general 
equilibrium  models  to assess gains  and  losses to different  interest  groups 
as a result  of alternative  public  policies.22  The assumption  is that  interest 
groups  lobby on behalf  of self-serving  policy actions, with actual  policy 
outcomes depending  on the balance  of power of the different  groups  in 
the political system. This kind of modeling  has helped to explain, for 
example, the nature of the tariff structure  in the United States and 
Canada  in terms  of the size and  cohesion of different  interest  groups  and 
voting  blocs. Such work  for the developing  countries  is inherently  more 
difficult, since political processes in these countries are typically less 
democratic  and  less transparent. 
So far, the framework  of political  lobbying  for distributional  gains  has 
been applied  mostly to trade policies, but it can also be applied  to the 
issue of exchange  rate management.  Under  which circumstances  will a 
government  choose to maintain  an overvalued currency  or to allow a 
sharp  premium  in the black market  rate? Under which circumstances 
will a government  attempt to fight inflation, as in the United States, 
through  a sharp  real  appreciation  of the currency,  as opposed  to a deeper 
recession  with  a stable  real  exchange  rate?  No doubt,  the  present  political 
weakness of the U.S. middle  west, the "rust  belt" and  the "farm  belt," 
has  enabled  the strong  dollar  strategy  to persist;  in  more  open  economies, 
the political  pressures  against  such a strategy  might  have proved over- 
whelming. 
Without  attempting  a comprehensive  discussion of this issue, I think 
that  certain  key elements  in  political  and  economic  organization  can  help 
to account  for  the differing  exchange  and  trade  regimes  in Latin  America 
and  Asia. 
22. See, for example,  chapters  7-13 of Jagdish  N. Bhagwati,  ed., Import  Competition 
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The income distributional  effects of alternative trade regimes are 
naturally  very complex. Specific effects depend on the nature  of trade 
controls (whether tariffs or quotas), the level at which controls are 
applied  (whether  on final consumption  goods or on primary  and inter- 
mediate  products),  the structure  of supply  (whether  the country  exports 
agricultural  or manufacturing  goods), the distribution  of quota rights  or 
tariff  revenues, and so forth.  But in almost  every case, trade  restrictions 
tend to shift  income  from  the agricultural  and  mineral  producing  sectors 
toward the industrial  and service sectors. Since the agricultural  work 
force in most middle-income  developing  countries  is typically  between 
30 percent  and 50 percent  of the total, and since agriculture  and mining 
account for a quarter  or more of domestic GDP in most cases, the 
political and economic effects of this particular  income redistribution 
can be profound. 
These distributional  effects provide some clues as to why the Latin 
American  countries  have chosen to rely on an overvalued  currency, a 
large  service  sector,  and  a small  export  sector,  while  the  Asian  economies 
have lived with the reverse. I believe that long-term  differences  in the 
balance  of power between urban  and rural  interests  help to account for 
much  of the discrepancy.  To a first  approximation,  the Latin  American 
governments-whether civilian  or military,  right-wing  or  left-wing-find 
their most important  constituencies among  urban  workers  and capital- 
ists.  For decades, the agricultural  sector has been relatively weak, 
though certainly  not powerless, almost everywhere in Latin America, 
with peasants  only loosely organized  and, with some exceptions, large- 
scale agricultural  interests unable to hold decisive sway. Moreover, 
political unrest is most dangerous  in the cities, so that urban  interests 
must be bought  off first in difficult  periods. Interestingly,  the opposite 
seems to be true in most of East Asia. Governments  there, whether 
Japanese  colonial  rulers  before  World  War  II or  nationalist  governments, 
have felt the pressing  need to win support  of, or at least to appease, the 
rural  sector. 
THEORETICAL  EVIDENCE 
The computable general equilibrium  (CGE) models developed by 
Jaime  de Melo, Sherman  Robinson, Kemal Dervis, and others provide 
the best evidence of intersectoral  resource  shifts and income as a result Jeffrey D. Sachs  551 
of trade  and exchange rate policies. In a CGE model for Colombia,  for 
example, de Melo and Robinson compare the income distributional 
aspects  of an inward-looking  strategy,  a tariff  on manufacturing  imports, 
with those of an outward-looking  strategy,  an export subsidy  on manu- 
facturing  and noncoffee agriculture.23  The authors  compute the factor 
shares of different social groups across the two regimes, with the 
following  result  (aggregated  over their  six-group  disaggregation): 
Policy 
Group share of income  Inward  Outward 
Rural  (capitalists  plus labor)  36.2  38.1 
Urban  (capitalists  plus labor,  industry,  63.8  61.9 
and  services) 
Tariffs  raise the price of home goods, reducing  the agricultural  sector's 
terms  of trade, and thereby  reducing  the share  of income originating  in 
the export  sector. The magnitudes  of the changes  involved  are naturally 
country-specific  (and  model-specific)  and  depend  on the degree  to which 
the policies are pursued, but the direction of effect is probably  quite 
robust. 
The same logic applies to exchange rate policy in response to an 
external  disturbance.  Suppose that a developing  country  faces a rise in 
the world  price of imports  relative  to the world  price of its exportables, 
as occurred for most of the developing countries in the early 1980s. 
Consider  three  possible  policy responses  to that  disturbance.  In  the first, 
the country  maintains  external  balance  by devaluing  the exchange  rate. 
In the second, it maintains  current  account balance  by maintaining  the 
official parity, but allowing a large discount to develop on the home 
currency  in a parallel  or black  market.  In the third,  it maintains  the parity 
and preserves  the unified  exchange  rate. The real exchange  rate is kept 
constant by a fiscal expansion financed  by foreign borrowing  or by a 
drawdown  of official  foreign  exchange  reserves. These alternative  poli- 
cies will show important  differences  in their distributional  effect, with 
the rural-urban  distinction  once again  playing  an important  role. 
In the first  case, the terms-of-trade  loss reduces national  income and 
23. See Jaime  de Melo and Sherman  Robinson, "The Impact  of Trade  Policies on 
Income  Distribution  in a Planning  Model  for Colombia,"  Journal  of Policy  Modeling,  vol. 
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leads to a drop in the demand for nontraded goods. The price on 
nontradables  declines relative to the price of tradables,  and resources 
are induced  to flow into the tradables  sectors. This increase  in tradables 
production  provides the resources necessary to balance the current 
account after the decline in the external terms of trade. In the second 
case, only the black market exchange rate depreciates. Once again, 
nontradables  demand  falls, but now only the price of import-competing 
goods rises significantly (the price of  exportables rises relative to 
nontradables  and  falls relative  to importables).  There  is a rise in import- 
ables production,  a fall in nontradables  production,  and an ambiguous 
effect on exportables production. The resources needed to maintain 
current  account balance  come mainly  from further  import  substitution 
rather than from export promotion. In the third case,  the price of 
nontradables  does not fall relative  to tradables.  Overall  national  absorp- 
tion stays higher than it does  in the first two cases,  because the 
government  undertakes  a foreign-financed  fiscal expansion. Of course, 
domestic absorption  ultimately  will have to decline in order to service 
the accumulated  foreign debt, but that eventuality can be postponed 
until  well into the future. 
The income distributional  aspects of the three cases are of course 
complex. For example, in the second case,  with foreign exchange 
rationing  and  a black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange, much  of the 
income distributional  effect will depend on whom the central bank 
designates as recipients of official foreign exchange sales. In another 
paper, de Melo and Robinson  have analyzed the income distributional 
effects of the first  two cases, with results that can also be used to infer 
the implications  of the third.24  They consider an across-the-board  in- 
crease  in  import  prices  and  an  across-the-board  downward  shift  in  export 
demands. In the case of foreign exchange rationing,  they assume that 
capitalists  in the industrial  and service sectors are allocated  the scarce 
foreign exchange in order to make purchases of intermediate  inputs, 
with other groups required  to purchase  foreign exchange on the black 
market. They then consider the distributional  effects of devaluation 
versus rationing  on seven population  groups, with the results  as shown 
in table 10. The table records  the change, in percentage  points, in each 
24. See Jaime de Melo and Sherman  Robinson, "Trade Adjustment  Policies and 
Income Distribution  in Three  Archetype  Developing  Economies," Journal  of Develop- 
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Table 10.  Effects of Terms-of-Trade Shocks on Income Distribution, Alternative 
Exchange Rate Policies 
Percent 
Changes  in share  of incornea 
Devaluation  Rationing  Difference 
Income  group  (1)  (2)  (1)-(2) 
Farmers  1.3  - 2.6  3.9 
Marginal  labor  0.4  -0.1  0.5 
Organized  labor  0.2  0.0  0.2 
Service labor  -0.4  1.4  -  1.8 
Agricultural  capital  - 0.6  - 3.2  2.6 
Industrial  capital  - 0.2  3.4  - 3.6 
Service capital  - 0.7  1.1  -  1.8 
Total  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source:  Jaime de  Melo  and Sherman Robinson,  "Trade Adjustment  Policies  and Income  Distribution  in Three 
Archetype  Developing  Economies,"  Journal of Developmnent  Economics,  vol.  10 (February  1982), p. 82. 
a.  From model base  run. 
group's  share  of total national  income. Overall  changes, summing  over 
the various  population  groups,  necessarily  total zero. 
The third  column  shows the differences  in distribution  arising  from  a 
formal devaluation  on the one hand and a split rate, with a constant 
official  rate  and  a black  market  devaluation,  on the other.  The real  battle 
is between agricultural  labor and capital on one side and the urban 
capitalists and service labor on the other. The agricultural  interests 
clearly benefit enormously  from the devaluation.  The alternative,  the 
split rate, results  both in low food prices and in the capitalists  receiving 
the favorable official foreign exchange. Both punish the agricultural 
sector and  benefit  the urban  sector. 
The third  alternative  policy, not explicitly  considered  by de Melo and 
Robinson, would maintain  the real exchange rate through  a foreign- 
financed  fiscal  expansion  and  would  have more  neutral  effects on income 
distribution.  Since the foreign borrowing  is necessarily temporary,  it 
can be seen as a mechanism  for forestalling  the choice over income 
distribution  that  is thrown  up by the foreign  shock. This third  alternative 
does not serve the short-term  agricultural  interests as well as would a 
devaluation, nor the urban interests as well as would the split rate. 
Eventually, however, the foreign capital inflow will cease,  and the 
distributional  fight will be more severe than in either of the other two 
cases, since on top of the problem  of a terms-of-trade  decline  will be the 554  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
problem of servicing an accumulated stock of foreign debt. The choice 
of whether to service that debt through explicit devaluation or rationed 
foreign exchange  will be essentially  the same as the choice  offered by 
the original terms-of-trade shock. 
These distributional effects  of trade and exchange  rate policies  have 
long been  noted by observers  of Latin America,  including Alexandre 
Kafka and Albert Hirschman.25 Consider,  for example,  Hirschman's 
observations  on exchange rate policy: 
In effect, maintaining  an overvalued  exchange  rate  meant  that  the exporters 
of traditional  primary  products  would  receive  a smaller  real  income  than  with  an 
equilibrium  or undervalued  exchange rate. At the same time, the overvalued 
exchange  rate  permitted  the  acquisition  at  favorable  prices  (in  domestic  currency) 
of those imports  that  were  let in by the control  authorities.  And  since machinery 
and essential industrial  materials  enjoyed preferential  status, the overvalued 
exchange rate acted as a mechanism  to transfer  income from the traditional 
export  sector  to the new industries.26 
Interestingly,  Hirschman goes  on to ask why  the same distributional 
results  could  not  have  been  achieved  in a way  that did  not  punish 
manufacturing or nontraditional exports: 
For  example,  why not tax the export  sector, subsidize  the new industries  and 
do away with the overvalued exchange rate so that industrial  exports are 
encouraged?  To ask this question is to answer it: in most Latin American 
countries  such a course would have been politically  impossible.  The power of 
the groups tied to the primary  export sector would hardly  have permitted  so 
direct  an assault.27 
Hirschman argues that the overvaluations were successful in transferring 
income  not  only  because  they  were  indirect,  but also  because  their 
effects were unrecognized by key sectors,  even-though  this is hard to 
believe-the  agricultural sector. 
The rural-urban  distinction is but one element in a very complicated 
picture. Ideology,  foreign policy,  and even national security considera- 
tions have also contributed to differences  in policy,  and, indeed, many 
distinctions  across  countries within Latin America and Asia make any 
overarching  generalizations  treacherous.  Several  qualifications  are 
therefore in order. First, there is no historical inevitability to the relative 
25. AlbertO.  Hirschman,ABiasforHope  (Yale  University  Press,  1971),  andAlexandre 
Kafka, "The Theoretical  Interpretation  of Latin  American  Economic  Development,"  in 
Howard  S.  Ellis,  ed.,  Economic  Development  for  Latin America  (St.  Martin's Press, 
1961). 
26.  Hirschman, ABiasfor  Hope,  p. 117. 
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influence  of agricultural  versus urban  interests in the two regions. It is 
well known that up until the Great  Depression, large rural  landholders 
in Latin  America  provided  the dominant  political  power  within  the ruling 
oligarchies. And, indeed, until the Great Depression, trade policies 
throughout  Latin  America  were stringently  liberal,  in line with the class 
interests of the ruling  oligarchs. The shift to import substitution  and 
vigorous  protection  of domestic industries  dates from  the decline of the 
relative power of the agricultural  sector during  the Great Depression. 
Similarly,  in Asia, countries such as Korea and Indonesia  pursued  an 
import-substitution  policy complete  with Latin  American-style  inflation 
rates  during  the 1  950s. It is not  that  rural  strength  in Asia made  an  export- 
promoting  strategy inevitable;  rather, rural  strength  helped to tip the 
balance in that direction in the 1960s, when the East Asian countries 
began  their  export  drives. 
Second, countries  within  a region  differ  substantially  in their  urban- 
rural  balance. Large agricultural  interests, particularly  in coffee, have 
remained  powerful in Colombia,  for example, and were a substantial 
political  force behind  Colombia's  liberalization  in the mid-1960s.  Third, 
intellectual  and  ideological  elements  have  played  a significant  role, along 
with strict economic interests, in defining  the trade and exchange rate 
policies in Latin  America  and Asia. Dependency  theory  and opposition 
to U.S. involvement  in local economies  have contributed  to the strength 
of protectionist  sentiment  throughout  Latin America.  The influence  on 
Latin governments of the Prebisch hypothesis that agriculture  and 
primary  products  were a losing long-term  bet for economic growth  also 
contributed  to the formulation  of the import-substitution  policy. 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  ON  URBAN  VERSUS  RURAL  POLITICS 
Some very rough indicators  suggest why the hypothesis of greater 
rural  power in Asia is at least plausible.  As shown in table 11, column 1, 
the population  in Asia remains  largely  rural,  while the Latin American 
population  is overwhelmingly  urban.  This  difference  remains  very strong 
even after  controlling  statistically  forper  capita  incomes  across  countries 
(not  shown).  Korea,  now highly  urbanized,  is the single  Asian  exception, 
but it is not in contradiction  to the thesis that rural  political  power is a 
force for export-oriented  trade  policies. Korea's decisive devaluations 
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Table 11.  Indicators of Urban versus Rural Power 
Degree  of  Net  exports of agriculturt  e 
urbanization  Degr-ee of  (pretgofGP 
1980  unionization  (Pe  g  f  ) 
Country  (percent)  (percent)  1962  1980  Change 
Latin America 
Argentina  82  16.6  11.3  3.0  - 8.3 
Brazil  68  36.6  4.4  3.0  -1.4 
Chile  80  8.0  -0.5  0.9  1.4 
Mexico  67  8.6  2.7  -0.7  -  3.4 
Peru  67  3.4  8.3  0.0  - 8.3 
Venezuela  83  24.5  - 0.8  - 3.4  - 2.6 
Weighted  average  72  22.2  4.5  1.2  -3.3 
Colombia  70  n.a.  6.3  7.2  0.9 
East Asia 
Indonesia  20  3.4  n.a.  4.3  n.a. 
Korea  55  4.3  - 3.8  - 4.2  -0.4 
Malaysia  29  7.2  10.3  18.6  8.3 
Thailand  14  0.4  11.3  8.6  -2.7 
Weighted average  31.5  3.7  3.1  3.5a  -0.4 
Philippines  36  16.3  8.0  5.1  - 2.9 
Sources:  Urbanization  is  measured  as  the  proportion  of  the  population  living  in  urban  areas,  from  World 
Development  Report 1982. Unionization  is measured as number of union members relative to working age population 
(ages  15-64).  Union  membership  is  from  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  International  Labor  Affairs  Office, 
unpublished  data.  All data are for  1983 or  1984, except  for Mexico  (1982) and Venezuela  (1979).  Net  agricultural 
exports are from various issues of FAO Trade Yearbook (United Nations,  Rome,  1983). The trade category considered 
is agricultural products,  total,  net of fertilizers and farm machinery. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a. Excluding  Indonesia,  for purposes of comparison  with  1962. 
1960, when Korean urban  dwellers composed only 28 percent of the 
nation's total population.  The second column of the table shows the 
extent of labor  unionization  in the two regions. Unions are, of course, 
mostly an urban  phenomenon. Not surprisingly,  the Latin American 
countries  are  far  more  unionized  than  are  their  Asian  counterparts.  Since 
urban  workers  are  a major  interest  group  in  favor  of overvalued  exchange 
rates, this difference in labor market organization  certainly plays an 
important  role in the political  calculus. 
Interestingly,  even though the rural  poor represent  the lowest eco- 
nomic  class in Latin  America,  reformist  regimes  in the hemisphere  have 
typically  focused mostly  on the urban  poor. According  to John  Sheehan, 
who has analyzed the political choices made by the left-wing  Velasco 
government  in Peru  in the 1970s, "Urban  labor  usually identifies  'pov- 
erty'with  itself.  The  peasants  and  landless  rural  labor  are  out  of sight... 
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when the squeeze  became intense,  these same poor dropped out of the 
policy picture.' '28 
The last three columns of table 11 show,  if not the relative power of 
agriculture, at least the difference in outcomes for agriculture in the two 
regions. These columns record the net exports of agricultural commod- 
ities as a share of GDP in 1962 and 1980, as well as the change in the 
share over those years. There were large declines in the net export ratio 
in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,  Peru, and Venezuela.  Only Chile shows 
an increase.  In Asia,  Korean  net imports of agriculture maintained a 
nearly  constant  share of  GDP,  while  the  agricultural net  exports  of 
Malaysia grew sharply. In Thailand the net export ratio declined signif- 
icantly,  but from a very  high level.  In Asia,  the net export  share of 
agricultural goods relative to GDP rose by 0.4 percentage point between 
1962 and 1980, while  it declined  by more than 3 percentage  points  in 
Latin America. 
To tie down the relationship of agricultural political power and export 
promotion would require a detailed country-by-country  study,  though 
an initial examination of the historical record in several countries lends 
credence  to the hypothesis.  In Argentina, for example,  it is clear that 
the urban-based political power of Peron,  combined with the political 
weakness of agriculture due to low world prices in the Great Depression, 
contributed to the decisive shift away from export promotion. According 
to Eugenio Maffucci and Lucio Reca: 
The distrust  of agriculture  and the search  for a more  promising  alternative- 
which turned  out to be industrialisation  via import  substitution-was reflected 
in a set of policies covering  the whole spectrum,  from  heavy taxes in the form  of 
low product prices [in agriculture]  enforced through state monopoly in the 
marketing  of grain,  to the gradual  abandonment  of research  and  development  in 
plant  breeding  except for wheat.29 
Up to the Great Depression,  the agricultural interests had succeeded 
in maintaining free trade and a competitive exchange rate. Henry Wallich 
has  recently  noted  a fascinating  example  of  this  link of  agricultural 
interests  with the currency,  at the end of the nineteenth  century.  The 
28. John Sheehan, "The Economics of the Peruvian  Experiment  in Comparative 
Perspective," in Cynthia  McClintock  and Abraham  F. Lowenthal,  eds., The Peruvian 
Experiment Reconsidered  (Princeton  University  Press, 1983),  pp. 387-414. 
29. See Eugenio  A. Maffucci  and  Lucio  G. Reca, "Agricultural  Exports  and  Economic 
Development:  The  Case of Argentina,"  in Nural  Islam,  Agricultural Policy in Developing 
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policy debate in Argentina in the 1890s was over the return to gold parity, 
which  would  have  required an appreciation  of the currency.  Wallich 
notes: 
But the issue of returning  to parity  was less a matter  of economic theory than 
economic interest. Appreciation  of the peso was hard on exporters and the 
agricultural  interests that supplied  the exports. These were the principal  eco- 
nomic  interests  and  the strongest  political  factor,  consisting  importantly  of large 
landowners  but also small  farmers  and  rural  workers.  They opposed  a return  to 
par,  though  they were amenable  to stabilization  at some lower  level.30 
And that is what occurred. 
In more recent times,  that group has not won its battles over trade 
policy  or the exchange  rate. Data developed  by Diaz-Alejandro  show 
how effective  Peron's trade and exchange rate policies  were in turning 
the terms of trade against the rural sector.  The ratio of the wholesale 
prices of rural  to nonrural goods dropped from a base of 100 during 1935- 
39 to 68 during 1953-55,78  during 1956-58, 85 during 1959-61,93  during 
1962-64,78  during 1965-67, and 75 during 1968-69.31  As has been typical 
in Argentine  policy,  the most recent  devaluation  and stabilization,  in 
June  1985, began with an increase  in taxes  on agricultural exports  to 
make sure that agricultural interests did not receive the full return from 
the rise in their product prices following the currency devaluation. 
While the Argentine pattern is familiar throughout Latin America, 
almost  the  opposite  is  true in Asia.  In Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Korea, 
Taiwan,  and Thailand, the governments  look to the rural sector  as an 
important element of support. The same was historically true in Japan, 
and  even  today,  the  ruling Liberal  Democratic  party  must  bow  to 
agricultural interests in maintaining high domestic prices for food.  One 
survey of the East Asian economies  has explained it this way: 
In 1921,  four years after the Bolshevik Revolution, V.I. Lenin instituted  a 
program  known as the "scissors" as the foundation  of his "New Economic 
Policy." Prices for agri;cultural  products  were to be set so as to minimize  the 
cost of living of the urban factory workers on whom Lenin depended.  . . 
Eastasia,  with  fifteen  times  the pressure  of man  on arable  land  [as in Russia]  has 
not  been  able  to afford  this  luxury.  Not only  would  large  portions  of  the  population 
starve  (in the cities first, of course), but  the countryside  would  quickly  reassert 
its preponderant  demographic  weight and "seize control of the cities" in one 
30. See Henry Wallich, "The Economic Background  of the Report," draft of an 
introduction  to an edition  of Paul  Wallich's  letters  from  Argentina. 
31. See Richard  D. Mallon  with Juan V. Sourrouille,  Economic  Policymaking  in a 
Conflict Society:  The  Argentine Case (Harvard University Press,  1975), tables 2-10,  p. 55. Jeffrey D. Sachs  559 
fashion  or another.  Instead,  Eastasian  governments  have  been forced  to employ 
what we call the "reverse scissors": a pricing  policy that favors agricultural 
production  and  encourages  the modernization  of agriculture.  At the very worst, 
as in China before 1949, governments have avoided excessive agricultural 
taxation  in the interests  of political  harmony.32 
Other discussions  of  agricultural policies  in specific  Asian  countries 
have also emphasized  the natural political  strength of the rural sector 
and, therefore, of the support for export promotion.33 
The link between  rural influence and export promotion  is only  the 
first step  in the  development  of  a  successful  export  program.  Once 
export-promoting  policies  get  under way,  urban-industrial exporters 
become their own lobbyists and eventually become the dominant political 
force in favor of an undervalued exchange rate, with rural  interests losing 
their relative  influence.  Clearly  this  process  is  under way  in Korea, 
where an enormous concentration  of export-oriented  industrialists is a 
strong force with regard to the exchange  rate and trade policy.  On the 
other  side,  after  decades  of  import  substitution  in  Latin  America, 
manufacturing exporters  are  so  weak  politically  as  to  be  unable  to 
overturn a strong currency policy,  even acting in conjunction with the 
rural  sector. Thus, the political biases of the export-promotion or import- 
substitution regimes probably feed upon themselves  over time, and make 
32. Roy Hofheinz,  Jr., and Kent E. Calder,  The  Eastasia Edge (Basic Books, 1982), 
pp. 92-93. 
33. Nimit Nontapunthawat  finds that "according  to the Bank of Thailand,  the 1973 
devaluation  was needed  to control  the huge  trade  deficit  that  had plagued  Thailand  since 
the mid-1960s.  The baht value was also allowed to fall in order  to keep the income (in 
domestic  currency)  of exporters  and  farmers  from  falling  and  to increase  the competitive- 
ness of Thai  export  commodities,  both  reasonable  moves for an economy  in which  a high 
proportion  of farmers'  income  is used to buy domestically  produced  goods and in which 
prices  respond  to the  world  market.  " See Nimit  Nontapunthawat,  "Agriculture,  Thailand's 
Mainstay,"  in Laurence  B. Krause  and Sueo Seikiguchi,  eds., Economic  Interaction  in 
the Pacific  Basin (Brookings,  1980),  p. 207. Brian  Wawn  finds  that "Malaysia  is aiming, 
not  just for  good overall  growth  in agriculture,  but  also for reduction  in poverty  as quickly 
as possible.  It is favoured  by ample  land  and  financial  resources  for this. There  is a strong 
political  commitment,  too, to rural  Malays,  who  form  the power  base  of the ruling  party  in 
the Government."  See Brian Wawn, The  Economies of theASEANCountries  (St. Martin's 
Press, 1982),  p. 58. See also Donald  J. Puchala  and  Jane  Staveley, "The  Political  Economy 
of Taiwanese  Agricultural  Development,"  in Raymond  F. Hopkins,  Donald  J. Puchala, 
and Ross B. Talbot, eds.,  Food,  Politics,  and Agricultural Development:  Case Studies in 
the Public  Policy  of Rural Modernization  (Westview  Press,  1979), pp.  107-31;  Sopin 
Tongpan,  "Agricultural  Exports  and  Economic  Development:  A Case  Study  of Thailand," 
in Islam, Agricultural Policy in Developing  Countries, pp. 240-52. 560  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
it increasingly  difficult  to change course. The last section of the paper 
turns  to some recent  evidence of such difficulty. 
Some Observations  on the Current Debate in Latin America 
Economic policymaking  in Latin America has been fraught with 
confusion, contradiction,  and frequent  reversals since the onset of the 
debt  crisis  in mid-1982.  Admittedly,  the economic  crisis  has  been severe, 
and the intellectual  challenge  in formulating  an appropriate  response is 
daunting.  Nonetheless, it is striking  how much  the various  governments 
have played  for time, refusing  to commit  to any policy, whether  one of 
export promotion,  debt repudiation,  or further  import  substitution.  In 
almost every country, the trade and exchange rate policies have been 
contradictory  and  often self-defeating. 
The exchange  rate  regime  provides  an excellent example. Every one 
of the large rescheduling  countries in Latin America has allowed a 
significant  margin  to develop between a "free" rate (either in a legal 
parallel  market  or in an unofficial  black market)  and an official  rate, as 
was shown in table 6. As noted, a black market  premium  on foreign 
exchange is likely to be biased against exports if import-competing 
prices are determined  by the free rate, while export  prices are set by the 
official rate. (As will be recalled from the table, Venezuela is  an 
exception.) In many cases, the failure  to depreciate  the official rate in 
line with the free rate also exacerbates  the problem  of budget  deficits. 
Since tariff  rates on imports  are governed  by the official  price of foreign 
exchange, the real value of tariff  revenues  can be substantially  reduced 
by a policy that keeps the official exchange rate at a large premium 
relative  to the black  market  rate. 
Mexico provides an excellent case in point. After two years as the 
darling  of the international  financial  community  for its strong  adjustment 
after  the onset of crisis in mid-1982,  Mexico aroused  substantial  worries 
about  its long-term  ability  to overcome  the crisis again  in the summer  of 
1985, even before the disastrous earthquakes  hit. The problem, very 
squarely, is one of exports. Most of the very sizable improvement  in 
Mexico's external balance since 1982 has resulted from a decline in 
imports, rather  than an increase in exports, as the following data, in 
billions  of U.S. dollars,  illustrate: Jeffrey D. Sachs  561 
Mexican trade 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Exports  19.9  21.2  22.3  24.1 
Imports  24.0  14.4  8.5  11.3 
Trade  balance  - 4.1  6.8  13.8  12.8 
Each time  the Mexican  government  has attempted  to increase  economic 
growth, the import  bill has begun  to rise once again, posing a threat  to 
debt servicing.  From  the first  quarter  of 1984  to the first  quarter  of 1985, 
imports jumped by 39 percent under the expansionary pressure of 
summer  1985  elections, while nonoil  exports  declined  by 16  percent,  and 
oil earnings  abroad  fell by 9 percent.  Thus, the overall  trade  surplus  for 
the first quarter  declined from 4 billion dollars in 1984 to 2.4 billion 
dollars  in 1985.  Before  the earthquakes,  Mexico  had  announced  its desire 
to renegotiate  the  terms  of its multiyear  rescheduling  agreement,  because 
of its need for supplementary  finance  at the end of 1985.  Because of the 
earthquakes,  the need for new money is substantially  greater. 
The failure  of exports to rise more dramatically  is due in part  to the 
continuing  vacillation  of the Mexican  policy authorities  over whether  to 
pursue  a sustained  policy of export promotion.  The recent vacillation, 
however, is nothing new, as shown by Balassa's historical survey of 
Mexican  trade  policies from 1956  to 1983.34  Until 1970,  Mexico was on 
a path of steadily  increasing  trade  protection,  with a strong  anti-export 
bias. Measures  of effective protection  of industry  show a sharp  upward 
trend between 1960 and 1970. For example, effective protection of 
durable  consumer goods and capital goods rose from 64.6 percent in 
1960  to 77.2 percent  in 1970,  while traditional  Mexican  exports showed 
an expected stagnation.35  Modest  export  incentives, introduced  in 1970, 
lasted until the balance of payments crisis in 1976 and stimulated  an 
increase  in nontraditional  exports, though  from  a very low base in 1970. 
The policy changes after the balance of payments  crisis in 1976  are 
somewhat  reminiscent  of the current  policy indirection.  A large  currency 
devaluation  in 1976  was combined  with liberalization  on imports  during 
1977-79.  Import  licensing  requirements  were replaced  by tariffs,  which 
were supposed  to be temporary,  but in fact were never removed. Plans 
34. Bela  Balassa,  "Trade  Policy  in Mexico," World  Development,  vol. 11  (September 
1983), pp. 795-81 1. 
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were also made  for Mexico to  join the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT). However, these plans, and indeed most of the liberal- 
ization,  were dropped  under  the pressure  of a sharp  real  appreciation  of 
the peso in the late 1970s.  The appreciation  squeezed import-competing 
industries and led them to bargain, successfully, for a tightening of 
protection  against  imports.  Tariff  rates  were increased  in 1981,  and  when 
the Mexican  crisis broke  in mid-1982,  thoroughgoing  exchange  controls 
and  import  licensing  requirements  were reintroduced. 
Since late 1982, the Mexican authorities  have operated  with a split 
exchange  rate  system, with  a controlled  rate  for preferential  imports  and 
all exports, and  a free rate  for remaining  imports.  During  1983  and 1984, 
the premium  on dollars  in the free market  fluctuated  on the order  of 20- 
30 percent, and the Bank of Mexico intervened  in both the controlled 
and free markets  to maintain  a desired rate of currency depreciation. 
That  rate  has  been  the subject  of heated  debate,  with  protected  businesses 
and most unions calling  for a slow crawl to fight  inflation  and maintain 
low real  prices for imported  goods. There  was a sharp  real  depreciation 
in the official  currency  rate at the end of 1982,  but the rate of nominal 
depreciation  vis-a-vis the dollar was not sufficient  to maintain  strong 
incentives for exporters. The recent movement in the real official 
exchange  rate vis-'a-vis  the United States has been as follows (note that 
a decrease  in the exchange  rate signals  a real  currency  appreciation): 
Real exchange  rate (1982:2 = 1.00) 
Quarter  1982  1983  1984  1985 
1  0.83  1.21  1.07  0.93 
2  1.00  1.18  1.04 
3  1.28  1.16  1.02  ... 
4  1.10  1.14  1.00  ... 
Thus, after  a sharp  depreciation  in the third  quarter  of 1982,  the currency 
has been allowed to appreciate  to a level higher  than that of mid-1982. 
The appreciation  is even more  remarkable  because the peso is measured 
against the dollar, which has itself appreciated  sharply against other 
currencies  since 1982. 
As with exchange  rate management,  there has been little progress  to 
date on export promotion  via the trading  system. Even with the free 
rates, most imports  still require  prior  licensing, so that the system still 
relies heavily on exchange controls. Since the elections in the summer Jeffrey D. Sachs  563 
of 1985, the government has begun once again to float the suggestion of 
Mexico's joining the GATT. It is hard to say whether the proposal will 
be adopted this time and whether membership in the GATT will mean a 
quick reform of trading practices. 
As Anne Krueger has pointed out, stabilization efforts are more likely 
to be costly  if potential exporters believe  that the government is likely 
to  reverse  any  liberalization  measures  and to  revert  to  protectionist 
"policies  as usual."  Krueger notes: 
Reallocations  will take longer  and be more  difficult,  the greater  are expecta- 
tions that the realigned structure of relative prices and incentives will not 
continue. If it is expected that the devaluation  and liberalization  will be short- 
lived, businessmen and consumers are likely to stockpile foreign goods in 
anticipation  of possible future reimposition  of [quantitative  restrictions]. In 
doing so, they increase the current  account deficit and therefore  the foreign 
exchange outflow required  to sustain the liberalization  program  through  the 
adjustment  period. In the context of a situation  in which foreign  exchange has 
earlier  been in excess demand  because  of the trade  regime,  increases  in imports 
and current account deficits may stimulate further speculation against the 
exchange  rate, in turn  tending  to force the reimposition  of controls.36 
Indeed Mexico has several times, most recently in 1976-78, embarked 
on a path of liberalization only to have  subsequent  real appreciations 
wipe out newly  emerging exporters and policy  reversals  restore tradi- 
tional privileges to protected industries. 
The  failure  of  governments  to  stick  by  liberalization  or  export- 
promotion policies is of course deeply rooted in the strength of political 
forces allied to the import-substitution strategy. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the types  of reversals  evident  in Mexico  are common  throughout 
Latin  America.  Corbo,  de  Melo,  and  Tybout  report  that  the  same 
backsliding was evident  everywhere  in the Southern Cone.37 Not only 
did  the  liberalizations  in  each  case  founder  in  a  sharp  subsequent 
overvaluation  of the exchange  rate, but trade liberalization  measures 
were frequently reversed  or postponed  as well.  The reversals  created 
precisely  the effects  that Krueger pointed out. As Corbo, de Melo, and 
Tybout note: 
An example is provided by the formal tariff reduction schedules of the 
government.  The schedules were broken  on one or several occasions when it 
36. Anne  O. Krueger,  "Interactions  Between  Inflation  and  Trade  Regime  in  Objectives 
in Stabilization  Programs,"  in William  R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub,  eds., Economic 
Stabilization in Developing  Countries (Brookings,  1981), p. 101. 
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was felt that  inflation  was not falling  fast enough.  Producers  reacted  by delaying 
making  major  resource commitments.  Such wait-and-see  attitudes  were con- 
firmed  by interviews with forty businessmen.  The interviewees reported  that 
they delayed  taking  action on government  policies for periods  ranging  up to six 
months  because  they were uncertain  whether  the policy would  be adhered  to.38 
Redundant protection  proved  to  be  another  major problem  in these 
countries. Nominal reductions in tariffs will have no effect if the reduced 
rates are still fully protective.  In fact, given the extent of redundancy in 
the protective  apparatus in the three Southern  Cone  countries  in the 
mid-1970s, the combination of modest tariff reductions and sharp over- 
valuations  of  the  currency  left  exporters  in each  of the  countries  as 
hamstrung a few  years  into  the  "liberalization"  as  they  were  at the 
beginning of the programs. 
Developing  a new export base in Latin America, it is clear, will be no 
easy job.  What could make it next to impossible  is the recent wave  of 
protectionism  in the  developed  economies.  Most  analysts  have  con- 
cluded that this new protectionism  has not yet been  severe  enough to 
impose  serious  costs  on exporters  from developing  countries.39 How- 
ever, the risks of much stricter protectionism,  particularly in the United 
States,  are  evident  and  must  play  a  major  role  in  depressing  new 
investment in Latin American export sectors, as well as in giving political 
weight to groups in Latin America favoring debt repudiation and further 
import substitution.  Increased  protectionism  worldwide  would  surely 
be the greatest blow to a successful  resolution of the international debt 
crisis. 
38. Ibid., p. 26. 
39. See, for example,  Helen Hughes  and  Anne 0.  Krueger,  "Effects  of Protection  in 
Developed  Countries  on Developing  Countries'  Exports  of Manufactures,"  in Robert  E. 
Baldwin and Anne 0.  Krueger, eds.,  The Structure and Evolution of Recent  U.S.  Trade 
Policy (University  of Chicago  Press, 1984),  pp. 389-418. Comments 
and Discussion 
John Williamson: I have no difficulty  in accepting  the stylized  facts laid 
out by Jeffrey Sachs regarding  the superior  performance  of East Asia 
after the second oil shock in comparison  with that of Latin America  in 
terms  both of growth  and of inflation.  The contrast  remains  valid if it is 
extended beyond the larger  economies analyzed in the paper to cover 
the smaller  ones as well. In recent years current  account deficits, the 
third dimension  in which macroeconomic  performance  is customarily 
measured,  have actually  been larger  in Asia-but  only because most of 
the Latin economies ran  into debt crises, which obligated  them to curb 
imports, so that their smaller  deficits are a reflection  of force majeure 
rather  than  of superior  performance. 
As Sachs points out, there is one notable exception to the behavior 
pattern  in each continent.  In Latin America,  Colombia  was a relatively 
high performing  economy through  the 1970s, and it has managed  to 
maintain  a reasonable  performance  and avoid rescheduling  its debts so 
far in the 1980s.  In East Asia, the Philippines  is much  more  like a Latin 
American  country  in its stagflation  and  debt rescheduling.  If we want  to 
explain  the different  patterns,  we need to explain  also these exceptions, 
and not simply  the superiority  of East Asia in general. 
Let me consider  the various  hypotheses  that Sachs discusses. 
First, th*<  size of external  shocks. I agree  with his assessment  that  the 
severity of the shocks was not the basic difference  between Asia and 
Latin America.' Indeed, Balassa's calculations suggest that Korea 
1. I reached  a similar  conclusion  in regard  to the different  Latin  American  countries  in 
analyzing  the results  of Thomas  0.  Enders  and  Richard  P. Mattione,  Latin  America:  The 
Crisis  of Debt  and  Growth  (Brookings,  1984)  in my paper  "The  External  Environment  and 
the Adjustment  Process," in Khadija  Haq and Carlos Massad, eds., Adjustment  with 
Growth: A Search for an Equitable Solution (Islamabad: North South Roundtable,  1984), 
pp. 283-303. 
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suffered  external  shocks that were much  larger  than  those of any of the 
Latin American  countries, while Thailand's  shock was virtually  as big 
as the largest Latin shock, that of Chile.2 Nevertheless, one must 
recognize that such comparisons  are quite sensitive to the particular 
time periods considered;  for example, even the oil exporters suffered 
adverse  external  shocks if we compare  1982-84  and 1979-81.  Moreover, 
shocks did differ substantially  from one country to another  within the 
same region, and I argue subsequently  that some of these differences 
were important  in explaining  differential  performance. 
A second hypothesis  Sachs discusses is the extent of borrowing.  He 
points out that Latin borrowing  was not very much  heavier  than Asian 
in relation  to GDP. But it was, of course, heavier  in relation  to exports. 
And  since the debt-export  ratio  is probably  the more  significant  indicator 
of creditworthiness,  that  does suggest  a certain  imprudence  in policy in 
Latin  America  that  was not present  in East Asia. 
Sachs also notes a couple of possible explanations  that seem to have 
involved  individuals  fantasizing  differences  between Latin  America  and 
East Asia in order  to rationalize  their  policy prejudices.  The assertions 
that  tax rates  are  lower  and  that  the public  sector has a lesser role in East 
Asia seem to me to have been buried  fairly  convincingly  by the evidence 
Sachs presents. 
I did not think the same was true on the question of public sector 
deficits. Table 7 does suggest that large public sector deficits have 
contributed  to poor macroeconomic  performance. 
Finally,  there  is Sachs  '  s favored  hypothesis,  based  on the  trade  regime 
and exchange rate management:  certain countries have managed  ex- 
change rates to ensure the competitiveness of industry and promote 
export  growth,  while others have not. 
This hypothesis  appears  plausible,  especially in extreme  cases, such 
as Bolivia. In October  the official  exchange  rate  was 75,000  pesos to the 
dollar,  while  the  black  market  rate  was about  a million.  The  only products 
still exported at the official  exchange rate were those in which Bolivia 
has an extreme comparative  advantage  and that cannot be concealed, 
2. Bela  Balassa,  "Adjusting  to External  Shocks:  The  Newly Industrializing  Developing 
Economies  in 1974-76  and 1979-81,  " World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  DRD  89  (World  Bank, 
May 1984), table 2, and "External Shocks and Adjustment  Policies in Twelve Less 
Developed Countries:  1974-76  and 1979-81," World  Bank Discussion Paper DRD 80 
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namely  natural  gas and metals. Since natural  gas cannot be stockpiled, 
it was still being exported normally, but even metal ores were being 
delayed  until  the next devaluation  of the official  rate. The inefficiencies 
and arbitrary  rents that result from such arrangements  are massive- 
though  smaller  now  than  they  were  several  years  ago, before  the  economy 
had adjusted  to the need for a major  real devaluation  and started  to buy 
two-thirds  of its imports  at the parallel  rate. The incentive to produce 
nontraditional,  nonconcealable  exports is nonexistent. 
Unfortunately,  it is easier  to establish  the plausibility  of this case than 
to demonstrate  it statistically. The most satisfactory  evidence comes 
from the estimates of effective protection by Balassa and others, but 
these data  relate  to the 1960s.  The data  on black  market  premiums  shown 
in table 6 also provide  relevant,  though  far from  perfect, evidence. For 
example, Venezuela pursued  extremely inward-looking  policies in the 
period 1977-81  even though  the black market  premium  was negligible, 
as a result of the abundant  supply  of foreign  exchange from petroleum 
exports. The statistics  on real exchange rates shown in the first  column 
of table  6 are  even less revealing,  partly  because they show appreciation 
in bilateral  rather  than  effective exchange  rates, and  partly  because they 
show appreciation relative to an arbitrary  base period rather than 
overvaluation  relative  to some persuasive  concept of equilibrium. 
Despite the inadequacies  of the evidence, it suffices  to establish  that 
East  Asia has  been more  outward-looking  than  Latin  America.  The  trade 
bias hypothesis can also explain the outliers, Colombia  and the Philip- 
pines; Colombia  was probably  more outward-looking  than most Latin 
American  countries,  and  the Philippines  more  inward-looking  than  most 
East Asian countries.  The hypothesis cannot, however, explain  every- 
thing. In particular,  Chile adopted  extreme  outward-looking  policies in 
the late 1970s,  but nonetheless  encountered  a severe crisis in the 1980s. 
The proximate  reason was the decision to freeze the exchange rate in 
the hope of combating  inflation,  which led to extreme  overvaluation. 
I am less convinced by the paper's explanation  of differences  in the 
trade  regime  as a function  of differences  in the interests  of the dominant 
class. The comparison of the distributional  effects of exchange rate 
devaluation  and import  controls is entirely unexceptional;  indeed, it is 
conventionally  employed  by the International  Monetary  Fund  to justify 
its preference for devaluation. But it is  not obvious that one  can 
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the rural  population;  if that were true, the European  Community  would 
not spend most of its revenue  on the Common  Agricultural  Policy. Nor 
does the political  difficulty  in Latin  America  of imposing  explicit export 
taxes on agricultural  commodities  that Sachs correctly  alludes to seem 
consistent  with the hypothesis  of a politically  weak rural  class. Nor can 
I easily reconcile  this hypothesis  with the massive size-over  3 percent 
of GNP-of  the credit subsidies  paid  to the agricultural  sector in Brazil 
before  the involvement  of the IMF. 
To my mind  a more convincing  explanation  than class conspiracy  is 
provided  by the simpler  hypothesis of policy errors:  that is, decisions 
that would have been made differently  had policymakers  been in full 
command  of the facts and taken a long-term  view. The initial impetus 
for import  substitution  came from  a faulty  analysis  that underestimated 
its costs and overestimated  the obstacles to export promotion. More 
recent errors  have, in my view, stemmed  primarily  from a factor often 
overlooked  in the profession,  except in the specialized  literature  on the 
political business cycle: myopia, political reluctance to accept short- 
term costs in the expectation  of longer run gains. Mexico, which used 
the transitory  income  of the 1979-81  oil boom to go out and  borrow  from 
the banks  so as to raise absorption  by even more  than  income, provides 
an extreme  example. But all the Latin  countries  Sachs discusses except 
Colombia  have at times allowed overvaluation  to emerge in the hope 
that it would  provide  a quick  fix solution  to inflation  (Brazil  did so only 
in 1980).  Colombia  is the exceptional  case in Latin  America:  it attempted 
to live by the permanent  income hypothesis during  the export boom of 
the late 1970s,  dampened  the business  cycle by running  large  budget  and 
trade  surpluses,  accumulating  reserves, and  refusing  to borrow  from  the 
banks, and even tried, though  without  complete success, to resist real 
appreciation  in defense of its nontraditional  export industries.  Myopia 
can also explain  the resort  to deficit  financing  and the excessive foreign 
borrowing  that, as already  argued,  contributed  to Latin  America's  poor 
performance. 
Thus, my basic explanation  of differential  performance  would run  in 
terms of the farsightedness  of policy formation,  with an exchange-rate 
policy dedicated to the preservation  of competitiveness and outward- 
oriented trade policies as  particular  manifestations of  less  myopic 
policies. I certainly believe this explains the happier experience of 
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Venezuela.  Myopia  also contributed  to Brazil's  problems:  the pharaonic 
investment  projects  of the military  era,  the  attempt  to prolong  miraculous 
rates of growth into the era of high oil prices, the decision to fight 
inflation  by prefixing  indexation  in 1980,  and the expansionary  policies 
that  led to the unsustainable  boom of that  year. Nevertheless, Brazil  did 
for the most part  pay attention  to securing  a competitive  exchange rate 
and might  just have escaped the need to reschedule,  had  it been located 
in Asia and therefore  not been subject to the problem  of contagion-a 
phenomenon  that Sachs overlooks. 
My impression  is that on the whole the Asian countries have been 
less myopic. Malaysia  is another  country, like Colombia,  that resisted 
the siren calls of the banks to lend it money when none was needed. 
Thailand  also seems to have been relatively  well managed.  Korea, it is 
true, got close to the brink in 1980 as a result of overexpansionary 
policies in 1979  and  large  external  shocks; had  it been in South America 
and therefore subject to contagion, it might well have succumbed. 
Indonesia was probably saved by its positive external shock. The 
Philippines  did not have that benefit, so it got into trouble like Latin 
America. 
If one has to pick one stylized set of facts to account  for the differing 
experiences of Latin America  and East Asia, then I agree with Sachs 
that the trade regime  and exchange rate policy hypothesis is the most 
plausible candidate. Nevertheless, one must note that the competing 
hypothesis  that  runs  in terms  of the work  ethic, educational  attainment, 
and entrepreneurial  motivation  has not been considered;  that outward- 
oriented  trade  regimes  and  competitive  exchange  rates  do not  necessarily 
go together, as illustrated  most clearly by Chile; and that the extent of 
myopia  helps explain  both the trade  regime  and other  factors that have 
contributed  to poor  performance. 
It may be useful  to add  a brief  explanation  as to why openness  per se, 
and not simply  the size of the export  surplus,  should  be a relevant  factor 
in determining  performance.  A country  with a very small trade sector 
generally has a limited range of exports based on resource-intensive 
products  that  are  exploiting  some  local comparative  advantage  bestowed 
by geology or climate. These products tend to exhibit both inelastic 
supply  and  inelastic  demand,  so there  is a very little  possibility  of export 
expansion  at the margin.  Import  capacity  tends to be entirely  preempted 
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industry  going  for  the  domestic  market.  Hence, there  is minimal  elasticity 
in the trade structure  to permit  adjustment  to trade shocks. This is the 
basic, though not the only, reason why the size of the trade sector is 
significant  in enabling  countries  to overcome external  shocks. 
Finally, I want to challenge Jeffrey Sachs's assertion that policies 
since 1982 in "almost every country" in Latin America have been 
"contradictory  and often self-defeating"  and lacking  any clear sense of 
direction.  On the contrary,  I think  there is a widespread  acceptance of 
the need to move to export promotion.  All seven of Sachs's countries 
undertook  major  real devaluations  after 1982. Four of the seven have 
not allowed any significant  slippage  since their  first  major  devaluation. 
Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela have all slipped  badly at some point, but 
all have made  subsequent  corrections,  at least partially. 
The case against  import  controls  as a way of life, which  is what Sachs 
attacks  in the body of his paper,  is vastly stronger  than  the case against 
their  use as a temporary,  emergency  response to a balance  of payments 
crisis, which is what he complains of in the concluding section. It is 
vitally  important  not to encourage  new investment  in inefficient  import- 
competing  industries,  but  instead  to promote  exports  of goods that  enjoy 
a real  comparative  advantage.  But  replacing  imports  by afuller  utilization 
of existing domestic capacity can often be a sensible short-run  policy, 
and  the quickest  way of achieving  that  may  well involve  the use of import 
controls. Europe did not begin postwar reconstruction in  1946 by 
liberalizing  its imports  against  the dollar  area;  it liberalized  as and  when 
the recovery  of the balance  of payments  permitted.  I would  recommend 
the same strategy  to Latin  America  today. Similarly,  no country  should 
plan to live with a permanent  premium  on the black market  exchange 
rate. But as a response to a loss of confidence,  while action to promote 
exports is being implemented, a premium on the parallel rate may 
conceivably  be less damaging  than  an overshooting  of the official  rate. 
In my judgment the biggest obstacle to export promotion  in Latin 
America  today  is the level of real  interest  rates  rather  than  exchange  rate 
or trade  policy. It is difficult  to envisage much  of a boom in investment 
in export industry  with real borrowing  costs in the range  of 30 percent 
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General Discussion 
Lawrence  Krause  agreed  with  Jeffrey  Sachs  that  the outward-looking 
versus inward-looking  distinction  is an important  one for understanding 
countries' macroeconomic  performance  and debt experience, but he 
added that this distinction ought to encompass more than trade and 
exchange rate policies. Robert Gordon pointed to apparent  cultural 
differences between Latin American  and Asian countries and to the 
concern of American  firms  with the political stability  of the countries 
in which they build  overseas plants  as two other factors that may have 
contributed  to the growth  in the Asian countries'  export  sectors. 
On the question of whether the Latin American countries have 
suffered  more severe external  shocks than  the Asian  countries,  Richard 
Cooper  noted that  shifting  the base and  terminal  years  used for compar- 
ison by even a year or two can affect whether terms of trade  facing a 
particular  country  appear  to have deteriorated  or improved.  For exam- 
ple, table 2 shows that Brazil's terms of trade deteriorated  markedly 
between 1979  and 1983,  but 1979  was a year  with high  coffee prices;  the 
picture  would  look somewhat  different  if one compared  1980  with 1983. 
William  Cline argued  that the terms-of-trade  comparison  in table 2 is 
misleading,  insofar  as the net improvement  in the oil exporters'  terms  of 
trade  from 1979  to 1983  reflects a surge and subsequent  collapse in oil 
prices that had a much  different  impact  on Mexico and Venezuela  than 
a smooth upward  trend in the terms of trade would have had. Sachs 
countered  that  the failure  of Mexico and Venezuela  to treat  the oil price 
increases during  the early part of the 1979 to 1983 period as largely 
temporary,  not the fact that  prices rose and  then  fell, was what  got them 
into trouble. Cline also suggested  that the magnitude  of terms-of-trade 
and interest rate shocks should be judged against a country's export 
base rather  than  against  GDP, since the export  base is the debt-servicing 
capacity  base. 
Much  of the discussion  focused on the relative  degree  of government 
interference  in the economies of Latin America  and Asia. George von 
Furstenberg  argued  that  comparisons  of tax revenue-GDP  ratios  across 
countries  are uninformative;  comparisons  of marginal  tax rates across 
countries  would be meaningful,  but the average tax rate is not a good 
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some fifteen  years ago as a good example  of a high  marginal  tax rate  not 
translating  into high  tax revenues.  At that  time  Indonesia  had  a very high 
tariff  but almost no tariff  revenues because the high tariff  encouraged 
widespread smuggling and evasion. The tariff rate has since been 
lowered, and tariff  revenues have gone up. Cooper also noted that oil 
royalties make up a significant  fraction of the revenue collections in 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Mexico, and Venezuela, and that these revenues 
are  quite  different  in  character  from  other  tax revenues.  Von  Furstenberg 
suggested  that some forms of hidden  taxation-for  example, real wage 
legislation in Argentina  that could be considered in effect a tax on 
producers-might be more  invidious  in Latin  America  than  in Asia. 
In William  Branson's view, evidence that government  deficits have 
grown more rapidly in debt-rescheduling  countries is not necessarily 
evidence of a larger government  role in their economies; an equally 
plausible  interpretation  is that  countries  that  tried  to avoid the effects of 
the oil shocks by fiscal expansion  got themselves into trouble. Cooper 
suggested  that a distinction  ought  to be drawn  between increases in the 
deficit attributable  to spending on, for example, quasi-governmental 
enterprises  and  increases  attributable  to increased  debt service. 
Von Furstenberg  cited as a historical  precedent for rural  interests 
favoring export-oriented  policies the conflict between the free-trade 
South and the protectionist  North during  the antebellum  period in the 
United States. Several other participants  expressed skepticism about 
this explanation  of the export orientation  of Asian policies. Gordon 
found the predicted  differences  in the shares of GDP going to various 
interest  groups  under  alternative  exchange rate policy regimes  surpris- 
ingly small relative to, for example, the rather  large changes in labor 
versus nonlabor  income in European  countries  that Sachs has found in 
earlier  work, and  questioned  whether  the differences  were large  enough 
to call forth a political polarization  of the sort Sachs hypothesizes. 
Krause  did  not  find  the argument  that  rural  interests  have  enjoyed  greater 
political power in Asia than in Latin America fully persuasive; he 
suggested  Taiwan  as a country  that  did  not fit  this generalization.  Krause 
also suggested that more attention be given to the role of historical 
accident  and  demonstration  effects in the policy determination  process. 
Gordon  noted  two additional  factors  that  might  deserve some discussion 
in connection  with the formation  of Latin  American  trade  and exchange 
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in motivating  policies that would keep out U.S. products;  and second, 
the severity of Latin American  inflation,  which might have motivated 
some policymakers  to advocate overvaluation  as an anti-inflationary 
tactic. 
Cline seconded John Williamson's  disagreement,  expressed in his 
formal  comments,  with  the view that  the Latin  American  countries  have 
done  little  but  play  fortime  since  the  debt  crisis  hit. In  Cline's  assessment, 
they have taken  significant  steps to deal  with  the situation.  For example, 
Mexico devalued the peso by more than one-third  from 1981 to 1983 
(although  it allowed some subsequent real appreciation  before new 
devaluation  in July 1985).  Similarly,  after the debt crisis broke, Brazil 
devalued  its currency  rate by 20 percent  and Argentina  devalued  by 40 
percent. All three countries have cut fiscal deficits relative to GDP, 
although  further  cuts remain  necessary. 